


In Face of the Barriers of National Division



In Face of the Barriers of National Division

**(A Selection of the Articles Published in
Japanese Magazines)**

**Foreign Languages Publishing House
Pyongyang, Korea
1991**



Coed Rim Su Gyong, representative of the National Council of Student Representatives in south Korea, attending the 13th World Festival of Youth and Students held in Pyongyang is warmly welcomed by Pyongyangites



The opening ceremony of the Pan-National Reunification Concert

Performances by overseas compatriot artistes








Performance by Korean artistes resident in China

Performance by the Seoul Traditional Musical Troupe of south Korea






The Pan-National Reunification Concert closes
with chorus "Our Desire Is Reunification"

Compatriots attending the closing ceremony
of the Pan-National Reunification Concert







Scenes of performance "Song of Happiness"
by 5,000 artists in Pyongyang



Participants in the Pan-National Reunification Concert have the grand national reunification march







Compatriots visit the old home in Mangyongdae where President Kim Il Sung was born

Fellow countrymen visit the Revolutionary Martyrs' Cemetery





Compatriots
look round
the Arch of
Triumph



Fellow
countrymen
tour the May
Day Stadium



Members of the Seoul Traditional Musical Troupe of south Korea visit Mangyongdae Schoolchildren's Palace





Scenes of merry open-air play of participants
in the Pan-National Reunification Concert






Members of both north and south Korean football teams enter, hand in hand, the May Day Stadium with a seating capacity of 150,000 built in Rungna Islet, a scenic spot





Members of both north and south Korean football teams exchange souvenirs and respond to the cheers of the masses





Members of both north and south Korean football teams play to bring earlier national reunification

Members of both north and south Korean football teams together pose for a souvenir photograph with a fraternal feeling



EDITOR'S NOTE

Sekai, Toitsu Hyoron and other Japanese publications recently carried articles on the fascist nature of the present south Korean regime and on the struggle of youth and students and other people from all walks of life against it and for the peaceful reunification of the country.

The editorial board publishes some of them in translation in several foreign languages.

C O N T E N T S

| | | |
|---|-------------------------------|------------|
| The “Sixth Republic” in South Korea and Voice of People | Ito Chihiro | 1 |
| The Truth of the Kwangju Incident to Be Disclosed | Cho Dok Gyu | 22 |
| Review of South Korean Authorities’ “For- mula for South-North Dialogue” | Kang Dok Su | 60 |
| The Government’s Reunification Formulas | Kang Dok Su | 80 |
| Focus of South Korea | | 121 |
| In Face of the Barriers of National Division | Moon Ik Hwan | 135 |

THE "SIXTH REPUBLIC" IN SOUTH KOREA AND VOICE OF PEOPLE

—The Reality of South Korea under
Roh Tae Woo's New "Government"—

Ito Chihiro

Eight years ago, on May 18, 1980, the "Kwangju incident", the citizens' uprising bathed with blood took place in Kwangju, South Cholla Province, south Korea. Roh Tae Woo who took office at the end of February set the settlement of Kwangju affairs as an important political task. However, democratic forces, the Kwangju citizens in particular, have been watching the new "government" with a reproachful look.

What do the common people of south Korea think of "President Roh" who professed himself to be an "ordinary man" under the slogan of national reconciliation and democracy?

How do the popular masses stand with the democratic movement of the nation in the situation in which democratic trends appeared in some measure following Chun Doo Hwan's strong-arm rule? What foothold do the democratic forces have at this juncture?

On the occasion of the founding of the "Sixth

Republic" I should like to tell you of the real state of the south Korean society which I saw during my tour of Seoul, the centre of south Korea, Kwangju with deep-rooted anti-"government" sentiments and Taegu of North Kyongsang Province, Roh Tae Woo's birthplace.

Merry '88 and Sad 44th Year

The placards bearing the inscription "There are so many days till the '88 Olympics" were put up everywhere at the railway station of Seoul, on the facade of the administration office of province in Kwangju and at the entrance of a primary school in Taegu. In addition the inscriptions dated the 44th year are seen in many places. Wall newspapers on university campuses in Seoul and leaflets concerning democratization movement scattered on the streets of Kwangju, were dated the 44th year of national division instead of 1988. The date bespeaks the tragedy that the national division followed liberation from Japanese colonial rule.

The "merry '88" and the sad 44th year—these two figures are symbolic of the "national dignity" and national sorrow respectively. At this juncture Roh Tae Woo's "Sixth Republic" was founded.

Loud Curses

When Roh Tae Woo administered the oath of

office as the "13th President" the wall newspaper in 15 sheets covering the entire notice-board was put up in front of the students' hall of the Chonnam University in Kwangju nearly 300 kilometers south of Seoul, which attracted the attention of many students. The wall newspaper written in red and black said in part:

"Let Roh Tae Woo's inaugural ceremony be his funeral ceremony. Let butcher Roh Tae Woo be heaped with curses instead of being offered bouquets and be stoned instead of being applauded."

Other wall newspapers, too, denounced the new regime in a sharp tone.

"Those who killed one person are branded as murderer, while he who killed many people is called a great ordinary man." This remark is a bitter jeer at Mr. Roh.

Some wall newspaper described the Rangoon incident, explosion incident in Kimpo airport and the south Korean air jetliner incident as "terrorist acts masterminded by Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae Woo".

Articles in many wall newspapers bore the signature the "Committee of Struggle against the Assumption of Political Power by Roh Tae Woo, Mastermind of Kwangju Massacre" and the date of the "44th year of the national division by US imperialists' occupation".

The wall newspaper with the same signature which was put up on the gate of a university called for launching a protest movement.

It said, "A meeting to oppose Roh Tae Woo's

assumption of office is to be held in front of the administration office of province at 3 o'clock p.m. Let us oust Roh Tae Woo blocking the way for the people to subsist."

It called for raising the voices of people against the new government in front of the administration office of South Cholla Province, the theatre of the Kwangju incident where 2,000 persons were killed by the airborne troopers 8 years ago.

Riot police in khaki uniforms, shields in hands, took up positions on both sides of Kumnam Street in front of the administration office of province before three o'clock p.m. A group of plain-clothes men wearing helmets was on standby. They were a riot police troop called "skeleton corps", for their white helmets were remindful of a skeleton. In case of an engagement with students the "skeleton corps" attack students through the rain of stones and incendiary bottle grenades, while uniformed riot police shoot tear-gas shells from a distance. The "skeleton corps" was the target of resentment of the citizens. After a while there appeared a loudspeaker out of a top window of the 7-storeyed Kwangju Catholic Centre, over which was shouted the slogan "Let us prevent Roh Tae Woo from assuming office and establish a democratic government!"

Some 100 citizens were singing the national anthem, locking arms with each other, in front of the centre and from its window leaflets were being scattered over their heads. The poorly printed leaflets carried slogans "Roh Tae Woo, the mastermind of Kwangju massacre, is the enemy

of the nation. Let us prevent him from taking office and win the right to life for the people. Victory for the people!" "We denounce Roh Tae Woo usurping power with the support of the United States. Abolish income tax. Let us drive out the US!" Citizens who had been watching the leaflets from afar came up to the centre. When they were reading leaflets, riot police shot tear-gas shells towards them. Then two platoons of riot police in gas masks came at them.

People dispersed in all directions. Several persons who looked like students were walked off, their arms twisted to their back, by plain clothes men. Surprise demonstration was held in front of the administration office of province and in many places in the city, at the whistle signal passers-by gathered and formed demonstration columns in a twinkling, scattered handbills and hurled fire bottles and stones at the on-coming riot police. Driving around the city in a car, I saw streets littered with splinters of bottles and stones. I wore the gas mask which I had at hand but tear-gas hanging thickly over the streets made me sneeze ceaselessly.

It is said that the tear-gas produced in south Korea to be the most poisonous in the world and that the tear-gas used in Kwangju was the worst kind of it. On the other day tear-gas sheels were shot in the university campus of the city, but people in the central part of the city at the distance of 20 minutes' car drive from there had to cover their noses and mouths with handkerchieves. Even girl students who had never participated

in demonstration lamented that they, affected by the noxious gas, might not bear a child. Around this time students and citizens visited, bouquets in their hands, the tombs of victims of Kwangju incident at a corner of the public cemetery which was in the suburbs of city and held a memorial service. There stood in rows 101 tombstones with inscription of "Grave of martyr 0 0 0, the son of Kwangju in May". 90 students including girls bowed twice before the graves and chanted in one voice:

*The friends who fought together are
not seen,
Only flags are fluttering in the breeze.
The years go by, but mountains and
rivers will remember you bursting
with wrath.
We will advance forward.*

Among them were students from Seoul which was distant from there. One of them said: "Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae Woo are responsible for the Kwangju incident. They have no right to live in this world. Roh Tae Woo's assumption of office as President is invalid and cannot be tolerated."

In reply to the question "What do you expect from the new government?", he said: "It is ridiculous to expect something of Roh Tae Woo. The resistance launched in June last year has not yet ended. We will win what is needed by our own efforts without pinning hope on Roh Tae Woo." Cold wind blew so hard that my hand

writing was numbed, but the voices of praying and singing were heard from here and there. Seven bouquets of chrysanthemum were laid before the grave of Li Han Ryol, the late student of Yonsei University in Seoul who died, hit on the head by a tear-gas shell in June last year, and greatly promoted democracy movement across the country. The tombstone by his grave bore the cross and the inscription "Grave of martyr saint Li Han Ryol coming from Chonju." Before three "graves of nameless martyrs", too, were laid fresh flowers in the glass box. Eight years have elapsed since the incident, but its memory is still vivid in the minds of people and makes them nurse deep-rooted grudge in their minds.

I visited the centre of democracy movement.

All flags, placards and posters to be used for demonstration in South Cholla Province are said to be made here. A young leader of the movement said to me: "I hope that the Japanese sympathetic with the democratic development in south Korea will pay their attention lest the militarist-minded elements of the Liberal Democratic Party hold sway over south Korean economy and culture. Now south Korea and Japan are sharing the fortune with each other in fear of the cold war. According to unofficial investigation, Kwangju citizens are exposed to radiation exceeding the risk dose 100 times due to the frequent accidents in the atomic power plant in the suburbs of Kwangju. We are plundered by the United States and have our human rights suppressed. We hope at least that we are free

from radioactive contamination. We hope that there will be no massacre as in Kwangju, apart from democracy." This is the heart-rending voices of the Kwangju citizens.

Sentiments of the Times

It is not easy to canvass the opinions of ordinary citizens in Kwangju. If the identity of the journalist is disclosed, they usually hold their tongue. It is not because they fear the retaliatory measure of the government in case their opinions are published in a newspaper but rather because they do not believe the press.

The deep-seated complaint is that the mass media is engaged only in the government-sponsored propaganda. The placard hanging on the wall of the Catholic centre was blazoned with big letters: "No distorted information, no biased information!" During the massacre in Kwangju incident the local telecast and newspapers were prohibited from covering the incident by the government.

One of the citizens who were watching the protest rally from a distance said with reluctance: "The inhabitants of Cholla Provinces have sympathy with the victims out of parochialism. I'm not happy about Roh Tae Woo's assumption of office as 'President', but since he took office I hope democratization will be promoted." A bookseller who put dissident publications on sale said, "Since Roh's 'government' was elected through

fraudulent election, it has no validity. However, since he assumed office I hope that he will strive to eliminate the regional difference in the economy and personnel administration and probe into the Kwangju incident."

I heard similar opinions in Taegu as well. A student who had voted for Mr. Roh in the presidential election stated: "I'm not happy about Roh Tae Woo taking office as 'President' but I think it was destined by the times. He cannot be excused from the guilt of murdering Kwangju citizens and has to work under guilty conscience."

The nation including Kwangju citizens are harboring deep-seated anti-government feelings. So, no matter how loudly "Roh President" may talk about harmony of the nation, it is not easy to melt their frozen heart. In fact even the supporters of Mr. Roh, do not place full confidence in him. If Mr. Roh does not want to meet a like fate with Chun Doo Hwan, with the '88 Olympics as a momentum he must strive to bring about the harmony of the nation, promote democratization and advance the policy of Copernican turn in relations with north Korea which goes beyond the historic June 29 declaration issued last year.

Liberty in the Bud

In this situation in June last year, democratization movement mounted across the country, which led to the issue of the June 29 declaration and, following it, the wind of democratization

swept across the country. The trend gained in strength with the end of Chun Doo Hwan's government. The trend of democratization found its expression in the press. Book shops in Seoul set up the separate bookstall for the "ban-lifted books" in front of them. The bookstalls were heaped with ban-lifted books. The list of the ban-lifted books pasted on the wall included over 500 kinds. The people reading books standing crowded around them. In Taegu the main streets were hung with the streamer with the inscription "Congratulations on the reissue of the monthly *Wolgan Chungang*". On the bookstalls for social science books in Kwangju, the ban-lifted books were prevalent.

Among them were record of the Kwangju incident, *On Socialist Art*, Marx's three-volumed treatise on the French revolution, reproduction of series of *Letters from South Korea* from magazine *Sekai*, books on the labour movement and the collection of Chong Ji Yong's poems. Magazine *Wolgan Chungang* whose publication had been banned in June 1980 was reissued after 8 years. The first number of the revival magazine featured the Kwangju incident with vivid photoes and suggested it as the task of the "Sixth Republic", to probe into the following seven problems—the press ban, intervention of the military in political affairs, the problem of Kwangju, undemocratic education, suppression of progressive forces, unfair distribution and authoritarianism. The remark to the reader said, "No one makes a gift of democracy and so it must be won. We must de-

fend and win the freedom of speech which is the basis of democracy by our own efforts, not by others. We pledge before the reader to serve as manure for the sapling of liberty to grow into a big tree in the future.”

A student who was looking into a ban-lifted book said in delight, “Too many interesting books have been published at a time for me to read all of them. However, I hope that more books will be put out. The bookseller was beside himself with joy, saying, “All the ban-lifted books are selling like hot cakes. They sell so fast that I can hardly be stocked with them.” There are many people who were looking at the bookstall for the ban-lifted books from a distance.

One of them said to me, “We are not accustomed to seeing such a wide variety of books. So far we have regarded books on labour movement as extremely special ones. Do the Japanese common people read such books?” Since freedom of speech had been repressed for a long time, they seemed to be nonplussed at the lift of the press ban. 19 applications were filed for permission to issue newspapers and four applications for permission to set up the broadcasting station. Every day there were almost ten applications for permission to issue a weekly magazine or a monthly magazine.

A high-rise building near the main street of Seoul was hung with a placard reading “For founding newspaper *Hangyore Sinmun* in March”.

The reporters who had been dismissed for their

struggle for freedom of speech were hurrying with the issue of the newspaper with Mr. Song Gon Ho, former chief editor of *Dong-A Ilbo*, as the publisher and president of the newspaper office under the slogan "The people's newspaper telling them truth".

They declared that they would not follow the government's notorious "guide to news coverage". The pamphlet notifying the people of the issue of the newspaper stressed, "We strive to rectify the structural error of the press toeing the government's line by founding a people-oriented newspaper as required by the times. We will not allow the mass media to become the private possessions of the privileged classes or appendage to power. The pressmen who had been dismissed or imprisoned for their struggle for freedom of speech have fought in hardships for freedom and independence of speech for over ten years. We will never succumb to pressure nor give up acting as the spokesman of the people". Fund amounting to five billion *won* was raised from citizens for founding the newspaper. Such way of raising funds had been devised, drawing a bitter lesson when in the past the *Dong-A Ilbo* was thrown into a fix, prevented from obtaining income deriving from advertisement rates by the pressure of the government. At the same time this showed the way for any member of the nation to become the masters of the press.

A newsboy who was employed in another newspaper company made a large donation though his pay was low. The goal of funds was reached in a

short time as about 3,000 persons made contributions. An examination of reporters for entering service with the newspaper company was held in the end of February. 2,764 persons, 140 times 20 openings for reporters, applied for it. Candidates exceeded 8,000 persons when applicants for other staff membership were included. This fact showed what great expectations were held by the nation for it. It was not because of good labour conditions. On the contrary, their expected pay was one third of that of the employees in other newspaper companies. The monthly pay of president Mr. Song, for instance, was equal to the starting monthly pay for employees of other newspaper companies. Nevertheless, some reporter left his former newspaper company and came to take the examination, saying, "I want to serve with the newspaper office which issues a newspaper worthy of the name." Mr. Song Gon Ho took time from the examination to meet me. He said, "We aim at issuing a circulation of 300,000 at first. We will make for the early realization of the independent reunification of the north and south and want to be a pillar of democratic mass media, national mass media. Our reporters and I are all ready to be taken to prison." As for the new government he remarked "Roh Tae Woo killed people, while assuming power. If freedom of speech is allowed, the fact will be laid bare. Liberty is not allowed to exceed a certain limit and the military men will surely reveal their true colour."

Founding of the newspaper which had been

expected in March was put off until May because of the lack of government permission. He said in a firm tone, "Since we enjoy the strong support of the nation, the government will have to give permission to us."

His remark proved how strong the wind of democratization was. Mr. Song supposed that during April-May it would be demanded to probe into the Kwangju incident.

The newspaper was going to use the Korean letters only, but not Chinese characters. It was designed to preserve the identity of the nation.

There is still an outlawed magazine despite the lift of the press ban. It is magazine *Mal* which was founded in 1985 by the journalists who had been dismissed from the *Dong-A Ilbo* and *Choson Ilbo*. It is putting up a stubborn struggle against repression including denunciation of the government's "guide to news coverage". It is a biweekly with a circulation of 15,000. It has issued up to the 20th number under the slogan "speech forum for democracy, nation and the people". It is printed secretly and distributed to bookstores through unofficial channels. Its editorial staff was housed in the first floor of a shabby building in a back-lane of Seoul which was crowded with automobile accessory shops. There were piled printed magazines and ten editors engaged in writing and in discussion. The office underwent frequent police search. At the issue of each number of the magazine the chief editor was arrested. So, reporters who became the chief editor, would spend in turn, one week in prison.

Until June last year, each time the magazine was issued, the office was searched and copies of the magazine were confiscated. Now confiscation of the magazines stopped owing to the waves of democratization but suppression continues. The income from advertisement is small and printing rate is high due to risk. The pay for reporters is half the pay for the employees of *Hangyore Sinmun*.

The representative of the newspaper Mr. Kim Tae Hong, the former president of the Journalists' Society of South Korea, says: "It is our line to disclose facts and tell the common people truth". The current trend of liberalization of the press is superficial and the government only lifted ban on the publications which seemed harmless, he said. According to Mr. Kim, for the liberalization of the press the following six contradictions should be settled: division of the country, classes, violation of human rights, ban on reports about military affairs; inviolability of the government party and big business, the imperialist aggression of the United States and Japan. Free coverage of these problems should be allowed, he added.

The Masses-oriented Principle and the Literature for the Masses

What do the masses inscribed in "three principles" of democracy, nation and the masses referred to in the slogan of magazine *Mal* mean? According to Mr. Kim it means the people. In

south Korea the use of the term people, is forbidden because it is included in the name of the "Democratic People's Republic of Korea" (north Korea). So, the term masses is used instead of it. The masses mean broad sections of people comprising workers, peasants, townsmen, the middle classes, conscientious intellectuals and officials, he said.

President Song of *Hangyore Sinmun* said concerning mass-centred principle: "After liberation from Japanese colonial rule those who had worked for it took leadership in south Korea. At present as in the past genuine democracy can be realized only when the oppressed masses take leadership". The term "the masses" is in wide use in reference to the democratic movement in south Korea.

At first the term began to be used in a definite meaning in the literature of the early 1970s. The term was used in the expression like the literature of the masses and the literature of the times of the masses. I met Mr. Hwang Sok Yong in Seoul and asked him about the concept of the masses. He is a leading figure of the modern south Korean literary world, the writer who compiled *Records of May Popular Resistance in Kwangju* and sponsor of *Hangyore Sinmun*.

Workers, peasants and the poor who offered their labour but denied their share were called the masses. In the early 1970s when "Park regime" promoted the economic policy the gist of which was "priority of construction to distribution", they were the common people who had no political

power. In the late 1970s when the Yushin (Revitalization) system placed the country under harsh suppression those who began to fight against its inhuman treatment were called the masses. When the theory on the subordination of the third world spread in south Korea following Park Jung Hee's assassination the whole south Korean people who were groaning under US imperialism were called the masses, and the term "the masses" is now used in this meaning.

This is the history of concept of the masses, said Mr. Hwang. How then matters stand at present? Mr. Hwang says, "The present time is in the conflicts of the masses."

What is noticeable is that the level of consciousness of workers is rapidly rising and that working class movement is being organized.

In the meantime, intellectuals are captivated by reformism and many people desire that reform will be brought about through election.

The resistance struggle in June last year was not linked with the struggle of workers in July, which shows symbolically the limitation of today's democratic movement, Mr. Hwang said. In Kwangju there is the Mass Culture Research Institute which promotes diffusion of culture. This was established in 1982 with the participation of Mr. Hwang. The institute is promoting national cultural movement in the five fields—literature, arts, cinema and propaganda including the satirical drama accompanied with dance which treats the current socio-political affairs, while striving to preserve the traditional form of national culture.

Its 200 members, given skill training under the guidance of ten researchers, put on drama, prepare video discs for the education of peasants and publish novels illustrated with the prints portraying a coal mine village.

The print on the cover of the inaugural number of its circular depicted the temporarily-liberated city of Kwangju and its citizens at the time of the incident. The drawer of the print is advisor Hong, the central figure of the research institute. He had been the representative of the research institute for five years until last year. He criticized the expression "cultural Olympics" spread by the government. He bitterly criticized the government saying that it was going to host the Olympic games with a view to corrupt mass culture with money and advertise kisaeng tourism. According to him the "government is concentrating its efforts on the Olympics to quench the people's discontent with the reality culturally and thus strengthen its leadership afterwards." The issue of the circular was suspended by the suppression of the government after circular No. 3 was published in January 1986.

His house was often searched but he is now writing a novel about the Kwangju incident.

Theology for the Masses

The concept "the masses" is being disseminated in the religious circles. The proof of this is the "mass theology" advocated by the progressive

group of Christianity. The mass theology which was mainly embraced by Protestants and part of Roman Catholics has served to promote the struggle for democracy against dictatorship and for improvement of the living standards of the poor since 1970s. 90 per cent of pastors who preached the mass theology suffered imprisonment.

I met Father Ho Byong Sop of the Presbyterian Church who had been active in the slum quarters in northwest Seoul since 1976, setting up a small church there. Father Ho explained to 60 believers about the right to life in his prayer, preaching and reading of the Bible. He debated with them about the cause of distinction between rich and poor and organized a basic community among the poor to improve their living. He established a nursery school and an evening school in the district beyond the reach of the government's welfare policy and thus arranged the seat of dialogue with the inhabitants. He points out the injustice of the poor's interests being encroached upon because of their poverty and ignorance and leads them to settle their problems by themselves. Relying on the socially awakened inhabitants, he is conducting a drive to reduce and exempt schooling fee for children and to request the government to install electricity and water service and set up hospital or clinic in slum quarters. The mass theology started in 1960s. The modernization policy of Park's government caused devastation of the countryside and impoverishment of peasants who swarmed in to cities to form slum quarters and became paupers of city. The government at-

tempted to evict them under the pretext of beautifying the city, which caused a social trouble. The former theology introduced the Western traditions and its preach was formalistic. But young priests who went among the suffering poor people realized that preaching about morality could not solve any problem and that socio-economic system should be changed. It was in connection with the adoption of the Yushin Constitution in 1972 that their movement developed into a political struggle. Then men of religion launched a struggle against dictatorship. The man who distributed handbills to people at the Easter prayer meeting in 1973 was accused of inciting them to a rebellion. But this angered theologians and brought about a change in the ideologies of the church leaders and led to consolidate the foundation of the mass theology.

After that theologians gradually came to speak for the poor's right to life. A certain professor of the theological college was put into jail because of the international appeal he issued on behalf of the poor. Father Ho said, "The claim of the masses and their struggle for survival awakened the church. The church put forward the mass theology in reply to the query of the poor". The mass theology which is based on the ruled-centred viewpoint instead of the ruler-centred one, studies the Bible from the viewpoint of political structure or economic sociology.

The advocates of the mass theology have set up a small church for the masses and, with it as a centre, are preaching the mass theology.

Father Ho is pioneer in this. The priests who hold the standpoint of the mass theology account for two per cent in the south Korean Christian community which is conservative historically. The conservative forces brand the mass theology as communist theology. A professor who taught the mass theology in university barely evaded being expelled.

Father Ho said, "We undergo ceaseless sufferings in our practice. The mass theology should be for the masses but not for the theologians or priests. I only hold fast to this viewpoint."

The concept of the masses is still ambiguous. But the fact that the term the masses is used in different fields seems to suggest the standpoint for the democratic movement in south Korea to hold. "From olden times the will of God was revealed in the masses" said Father Ho. His remark can be interpreted as meaning that the people's voice is Heaven's voice.

(from No. 5 of *Sekai* for 1988)

THE TRUTH OF THE KWANGJU INCIDENT TO BE DISCLOSED

Cho Dok Gyu

The sensational accusations of witnesses began to be made public eight years after the Kwangju popular uprising.

Eight years have already passed since the Kwangju popular uprising in 1980. The truth of the Kwangju incident bathed in the blood of the people has been covered up by the Chun Doo Hwan-led military dictatorship. But the bereaved Kwangju people still bear deep-rooted grudge and are raising their voice, demanding that the truth of the Kwangju incident be cleared up, that the validity of "Chun Doo Hwan regime" be denied and that the United States must be called to account for it.

So-called "democratization" is loudly spoken about in the "Sixth Republic" led by Roh Tae Woo who appeared professing himself as an "ordinary man" under the cloak of "democracy" covering Chun Doo Hwan military dictatorship. In this situation the public opinion is seething with the demand that the validity of "Roh Tae Woo's regime" be reexamined through the probe into the Kwangju incident and is denying its validity.

People of all walks of life insisted that the truth of the Kwangju incident be probed into to clarify its character and work off the grudge of Kwangju citizens.

First, let me allow to air some of their opinions. Assemblyman Pak Chan Jong, an independent politician, said: "The tragedy of Kwangju is unprecedented one in the history of the nation. Lament over Kwangju is still heard. It is a national sorrow and anti-historical tragedy. The point is that the honest people were shot and stabbed at random. It was brutal. It was not war but soldiers who were thrown into the city to maintain order committed murder and even children who tried to escape were killed and buried in the cemetery in Mangwol-dong. The tragic incident in Kwangju must be cleared up through the political investigation by the National Assembly."

Mr. Pak insisted on the validity of the Kwangju popular movement, saying "The Kwangju resistance struggle is neither a rebellion nor denunciation provoked by the unsound elements. When the nation was faced with the choice of democracy they all desired, the military authorities indiscriminately suppressed the mass movement, causing the citizens to groan." "It is known to all that it is out of ardent patriotic sentiments, that the Kwangju citizens and many other people rose in the cause of democracy, kindling the torchlight of justice in May 1980." Sin Gi Ha, an assemblyman from the Party for Peace and Democracy said and warned "If the current government tries to evade responsibility for the incident by water-

ing down, or distorting the truth of the incident, it cannot escape stern trial by history and the nation.”

Mr. Myong Jin, religious man, (the resident priest of the Kaeun Temple) began with the remark that following the Kwangju incident the validity of the “Fifth Republic” was questioned and at the same time the anti-US movement broke out. He averred, “The radical solution of Kwangju incident is to remove its cause, in other words, to realize democracy for which so much blood was shed and build a national independent state.”

Mr. Chon Gye Ryang, chairman of the Association of the Bereaved Families in May 18 Kwangju Uprising, spoke concerning the Kwangju popular resistance struggle, “For us, May 18 struggle was a point of departure for democratic, national-historical movement which threw brilliant rays over this land and at the same time a self-sacrificing resistance to oppose dictatorship and injustice and defend the sacred human conscience and sovereignty.” He called for the probe into the Kwangju incident, saying, “In this land the government incapable of settling the Kwangju incident in May has no historical validity and without fair assessment of the Kwangju popular resistance struggle democratization cannot carry forward our history even an inch.”

Mr. Chong Ho Gyong, a leader of the South Korean Catholic Peasant Association, said, “The Kwangju incident is a tragedy, a wound and grudge caused in Kwangju by bitter conflicts between democratic forces and military dictatorship, be-

tween the masses and privileged forces and between the national forces and foreign forces.”

The authorities of the Chun Doo Hwan’s “government” branded the Kwangju incident as “rebellion of rioters”. But as mentioned above, many intellectuals, pressmen, religious men and other broad sections of democratic figures in opposition regard the Kwangju incident as a popular uprising which inherited the historical tradition of the democratization movement against dictatorship.

The “Committee for Promotion of Democratic National Reconciliation”— A Cooperation Machinery for Roh Tae Woo’s “Regime”

The demand for the probe into the Kwangju incident came to a head around the presidential election held toward the end of 1987 and aroused much discussion in south Korea. So Roh Tae Woo was strongly requested to clear up the Kwangju incident and to call the offenders to account. Needless to say, this war aimed at taking Roh Tae Woo to account and furthermore, questioning the validity of his “government.”

In this situation Roh Tae Woo who was barely elected “President” through the fraudulent election conducted with the use of money and the government authority as non-government parties failed to nominate a single candidate for “President”, rigged up the bogus “Committee for Promotion of Democratic National Reconciliation”. He

tried to abate the discontent rife among the nation and the claim of the south Korean people for investigation of the Kwangju incident. Its first plenary meeting was held on January 16 with wide publicity given to it.

The CPDNR was composed of 52 members. "Most of its members can be characterized as 'moderates', 'conservative' or 'neutral' who gave the impression as if they were 'clients' who appear whenever something happens" (March issue of *Sindong-A*). As mentioned above, it is undeniable that the CPDNR is a cooperative organization to pave way for Roh Tae Woo to take office as "President" and for the "Sixth Republic". But, contrary to Roh Tae Woo's intention, the debates on the Kwangju incident in the CPDNR agitated the public opinion as to the investigation of the Kwangju uprising and bringing the offenders to account, and matters did not go as was expected.

The national reconciliation subcommittee of the CPDNR whose mission it was to debate about the Kwangju incident began its work on February 1. That day for exact information of the incident the members of the subcommittee watched three video tape recordings—"Kwangju, the land of grudge, accuses" (produced by the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan), "Progress of the Kwangju incident" (produced by the Emergency Council of Christian Academy of Korean Question in Japan) and "When that day of May comes round" (produced by the Justice and Peace Committee of Kwangju Roman Catholic Parish). Embarrassed at this, "the Democratic Justice

Party compared the tape recordings with those shown to the assemblymen from the party in 1985 at the Central Political Institute for brainwashing and felt assured, finding that there was little difference between them, they say" (the March issue of *Wolgan Choson*). To such an extent the CPDNR strayed away from the course scheduled by the government. From the third when the testimony of Mr. Li Gwang Yong, vice-chairman of the Association of the Wounded on May 18, began to be made the news agencies at home and abroad focussed their attention on the CPDNR and this got on the nerves of Roh Tae Woo and his company, the Democratic Justice Party and all others in office (the March issue of *Wolgan Choson*).

The March issue of *Wolgan Choson* carried the photo of Mr. Li who in the witness box and the substance of his testimony given at the meeting of the national reconciliation subcommittee held on the second floor of the detached building of the Monopoly Office in Chongno District, Seoul:

"...After giving testimony for about an hour, Mr. Li suddenly remarked, 'The actions of the then airborne troops and the 26th Division are not known to the public' and went on to say that he was going to make public top secret informations he has recently received from abroad. He rapidly gave a half-an-hour account of the military operation from May 18 when the Seventh Airborne Brigade of the Special Operation Command stationed in Kwangju until the dawn of 27th when they completely occupied the administra-

tion office of South Cholla Province, which made the atmosphere of the meeting hall extremely tense. In his testimony he mentioned the names of Chong Ho Yong, Minister of National Defence and the then commander of Special Operation Command, Choe Se Chang, commander of airborne brigade, Pak Jun Byong, chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, the then commander of the 20th Division, and other field grade officers (at present commanders of troops deployed at the front) and detailed strength of the two armies as if he had eavesdropped on the council of war....” Closing his testimony, Mr. Li said, “The Kwangju citizens do not recognize the CPDNR and I took the floor to tell you of the attitude of Kwangju citizens”. He remarked sternly, “Can you, the likely servants of the Democratic Justice Party, settle the Kwangju affair? There is a rumour afloat that the ruling party has already drawn up a statement the prime minister will make public on behalf of the CPDNR, if you want to do formalistic factfinding, make a declaration of conscience and secede from the ‘committee’.” And he made clear the attitude of the Kwangju citizens toward the ruling party and the CPDNR. Then at the meeting of the subcommittee Mr. Li testified to the action of the martial law forces at that time:

“When at first students came out into the streets the citizens merely looked on them but some of paratroopers so brutally put down the demonstration and they looked so disgusting like butchers killing dogs or pigs that the citizens rose in rebellion.” And he accused the riot troops of

their brutal massacre, saying, "Seeing fathers, mothers, brothers and sisters being shot to death by those guys how can they do otherwise than rise in arms?"

Mr. Chon Gye Ryang, chairman of the Bereaved Families in May 18 Kwangju Uprising remarked, "The May 18 incident might have taken place in Seoul, Pusan or Taegu, but why did it take place in Kwangju? Because the military forces chose Kwangju to usurp political power and the place was suitable because of the influence of Kim Dae Jung there". He averred that the Kwangju massacre was committed according to the premeditated scheme of the military forces. He went on to say that "having usurped power through the fraudulent election with the backing of the United States, Roh Tae Woo was making every conceivable effort to erase his blood-stained murderer's image". He challenged the Roh Tae Woo's government, saying, "They will launch more vigorous struggle to counter the scheme to obscure the names and atrocities of the ringleaders of massacre, taking advantage of the trend of democratization."

The shocking testimonies of the witnesses of the Kwangju uprising led to delving into many puzzles about the Kwangju incident, far from abating the demand for investigation of the incident. The CPDNR wound up its activity with Roh Tae Woo's assumption of office as "President" but, with this as an occasion, the vivid testimonies of the witnesses came to be known to the public through the mass media, which helped to clear

up the truth of the Kwangju incident.

All the testimonies cannot be quoted here but they will be given as far as space permits to probe into the Kwangju incident.

Now let us trace the situation on the eve of the Kwangju incident in 1980 and its development in chronological order.

The Chronological Records of the Kwangju Incident

April 14, 1980

Chun Doo Hwan, the National Army Security Commander, took office as the Deputy Director of the South Korean Central Intelligence Agency whose post had been vacant since the "December 12 purge coup in the army" in 1979. He held the real power. In his statement Choe Gyu Ha expressed his regret at the speeches and actions affecting adversely the unity of the nation which took no account of the grave situation of the country and requested the students' movement to exercise self-restraint.

April 15

Students disproved the statement of "President" Choe. Universities in Seoul rose up simultaneously in the struggle.

April 21

Over 7,000 workers of the Tongwon Colliery went on a sitdown strike for higher wages.

The authorities dispatched one battalion of paratroopers to cope with them. The arrested exceeded one hundred. Labour disputes spread over all parts of south Korea.

April 30

At the meeting of commanders of all armies Chun Doo Hwan said, "The recent social disorder cannot be left as it is. A resolute measure will be taken for national security." In a press conference Li Hui Song, martial law commander, referred to "the agitation rally of some politicians who used campuses for political propaganda." He hinted at the activity of Mr. Kim Dae Jung.

May 1

Demonstrations were staged at Chungnam University and Sung Kyun Kwan University in Seoul.

May 2

A large-scale anti-government rally was held at Seoul University. It demanded the immediate repeal of the martial law and checked the constitutional revision. Demonstrations were staged in demand of revoke of martial law and elimination of remnants of "Yushin" at Sung Kyun Kwan, Chonbuk and Chonnam Universities.

May 3

Anti-government demonstrations were held at Koryo and Choson Universities. It was announced at Seoul University that "in case the emergency martial law was not lifted until the 14th a general

assembly of students would be held on the morning of the 15th to launch a staunch struggle". 50,000 students from seven universities took part in demonstrations from the 1st to the 4th of May.

May 7

The Central Committee of the "National Alliance for Democracy and National Unification" co-chaired by five persons including Yun Bo Son, Kim Dae Jung and Ham Sok Hon, proclaimed the "nation's declaration for the promotion of democratization" and demanded resignation of Chun Doo Hwan.

May 12

In their statement the chairmen of students' associations of 26 universities including Seoul University said, "We oppose the attitude of the authorities which regard the actions of students as social disorder. We will take nonviolent and peaceful actions, taking regular lessons."

From that night on martial law forces were stationed at government organs, newspaper offices, broadcasting stations and other public establishments in Seoul and other major cities of south Korea.

May 13

The martial law troops which had been dispatched to major government establishments and information services in Seoul were withdrawn.

But all the police in the country were ordered to be on "standby alert for an emergency".

In its statement the students' association of Seoul University announced that the program which had been made public on the 3rd of May would be suspended. That evening students' demonstration was held near the Kwanghwa Gate in the central part of Seoul.

May 14

60,000 students from 34 universities and colleges in Seoul, Taegu, Chonju, Kwangju and Pusan staged demonstrations.

May 15

Over 100,000 students from 60 universities and colleges in south Korea held street demonstrations. The students of Seoul, Koryo, Yunsei and Sung Kyun Kwan Universities staged powerful demonstrations under the slogans "Resign, Chun Doo Hwan!" and "Resign, Sin Hyon Hwak!"

Sin Hyon Hwak issued a special talk in which he stressed, "In conformity with the development of the situation we will properly adjust the political programme in close consultation with the National Assembly and move it up as much as possible to the desire of the nation. The martial law will be lifted without delay when the situation is considered to be stable."

The representatives of 33 universities and colleges in Seoul decided on "watching the attitude of the authorities". Demonstrations broke up except in some districts.

May 17

The government authorities held an extraordinary Cabinet conference.

May 18

It was decided to extend the enforcement of the "emergency martial law" over the whole country except for Province Cheju as of 00:00, May 18. The Martial Law Command walked off democratic figures including Kim Dae Jung, scores of student leaders, Li Hu Rak, the former director of the CIA, Pak Jong Gyu, the former Blue House security chief and so on.

On May 18 the Martial Law Command declared the "national emergency martial law". It banned:

- 1) all the indoor rallies for political activity,
- 2) political speech at the nonpolitical meeting,
- 3) absence from office and workplace,
- 4) slander on the former and the present head of state,
- 5) spreading of rumours.

It adopted other prohibitive measures additionally and closed all the universities and colleges in south Korea.

5,000 students of Chonnam University in Kwangju gathered in Kumnam Street and staged demonstration holding up placards with the inscription "Chun Doo Hwan and Sin Hyon Hwak, resign". The Martial Law Command suppressed the demonstration, throwing in paratroops.

May 19

The Martial Law Command blocked the Nation-

al Assembly and the headquarters of government and opposition parties and forbade all political activities. From the previous day demonstrations were held in Kwangju. With 1,000 citizens and students from 9 universities and colleges joining the demonstration, 15,000 demonstrators seized the Kwangju Broadcasting Station shouting, "Why do not newspapers and TV report the truth?" The Martial Law Command repressed them mercilessly, throwing in about 3,000 troops from one paratroop brigade.

May 20

The participants of the anti-government demonstration swelled to 100,000. Demonstrators occupied the administration office of South Cholla Province, the station and banks and so on. They were joined by scores of buses and taxis. They continued with demonstration in disregard of curfew from 9 p.m. until 4 a.m. On the same day Sin Hyon Hwak-led Cabinet resigned in a body on account of the disturbance.

May 21

Resistance in Kwangju developed into a street fighting with the martial law forces. The demonstrators are said to number 200,000 or 300,000. People, young and old, men and women, all alike, took part in the struggle. The Martial Law Command additionally sent there 1,000 strong paratroops and two brigades from Seoul. Soldiers confronted demonstrators in front of the administration office of the province. They fired at citizens

indiscriminately. The masses took away thousands of rifles, ammunitions and explosives from the armories of police and the local defence force in the city and in the suburbs and captured armoured cars, military jeeps and trucks from factories and fiercely gunfought with soldiers, shouting, "Tear Chun Doo Hwan limb from limb!"

May 22

Soldiers were not seen in the streets. In the peaceful atmosphere 100,000 citizens held a meeting in front of the administration office of the province.

According to the statement of the authorities, the anti-government demonstration spread to 16 cities and counties of Cholla Provinces up to that day. In its interim report on the investigation of Mr. Kim Dae Jung the Martial Law Command said that Mr. Kim egged students on to demonstrations and plotted a popular uprising to overthrow the government.

May 23

5,000 citizens pledged staunch resistance struggle before the bodies of victims placed in front of the administration office of the province.

May 24

The martial law army armed with heavy arms closed in on Kwangju. The citizens built barricades to counter them. There was sporadic gunfighting. In front of the administration office of the province 30,000 citizens burnt Chun Doo Hwan in

effigy. The United States dispatched the aircraft carrier *Coral Sea* to the Korean waters.

May 25

The Martial Law Command published a warning that it was ready to use armed force. It additionally sent 10,000 strong paratroops to Kwangju. Choe Gyu Ha aboard a helicopter made an aerial inspection of Kwangju city. The Martial Law Command sent an ultimatum prior to the intrusion of troops into Kwangju.

May 26

The martial law troops besieging Kwangju moved into streets. The citizens denounced it as a "breach of promise", and prepared themselves for resistance. The committee for appeasement of the provincial population begins negotiations with the regional command of the martial law troops in the suburbs.

May 27

The martial law troops repressed the insurgents by force of arms, throwing in special paratroops and the regular ground forces. They numbered 25,000. They forced their way into the central plaza in front of administration office of the province occupied by the insurgent civilians. A fierce fight was waged. By seven in the morning the martial law troops seized Kwangju completely.

May 31

The Martial Law Command issued a statement about the Kwangju incident.

It said that the students and the lawyer who played the leading part in the incident met Mr. Kim Dae Jung before its outbreak and accused Mr. Kim of being the "behind-the-scene manipulator of the Kwangju incident".

June 1

Concerning the hawkish measure the south Korean government took against the anti-government movement, US President Carter said, "It is apparently retrogression in democratization. ...Priority should be given to security against communism... There will be no change in the US policy toward south Korea".

Let me quote the testimonies of the witnesses of the Kwangju incident carried in the March issue of the south Korean monthly *Wolgan Choson* to trace the incident.

Testimonies as to the Popular Resistance in Kwangju

—Pak Hyo Song (Chief of information section of the "save-situation" committee)

I wonder whether it was 19th or 20th. The people withdrew up to the vicinity of bus terminal. Before fire broke out at the "MBC" broadcasting station, I saw a burning car and a young man lying dead beside it, a bayonet stabbed into

his body.

A shot was heard from the direction of the fountain in front of the administration office of province and a middle school student who had come following the demonstrators collapsed with a groan.

Those who were beaten by clubs on the head or shoulder collapsed there. The students thrown into vans were struck with rifle butt.

Those who were chased fled in all directions and those who failed to escape were beaten with clubs. Those who were caught were forced to kneel down, their knees kicked by military boots or struck with the birch stick in cold blood.

—Yun Sok Ru (Commander of insurgent civilians)

At about four o'clock on the morning of the 26th the soldiers broke into the administration office of province, shooting guns and flamethrowers without advance notice.

I was caught by them in the deputy-governor's office.

Outside the deputy governor's office I saw a person lying dead scorched by the flame shot out of flamethrowers.

—Kim Jong Bae (The then 3rd-grade student of Choson University)

It was not long before I returned to the Agricultural College of Choson University after demobilization from the army. So I was little interested in the student movement. It was the shocking

incident on the 21st that made me join those who occupied the administration office of the province.

When the martial law troops started to fire a volley in front of the administration office of the province on the afternoon of the 21st, I was near the Catholic centre.

At first I thought they were firing blank shots, but I saw people falling down everywhere. How can it be? To think that the army is firing at citizens. I was thrown into consternation.

A high schoolgirl in uniform jacket and white sporting trousers was passing by me. Suddenly she collapsed, hit by a stray bullet.

I hesitated for a while for fear of being shot. When I took her to a place of safety, I found she was already dead.

I took up arms that evening.

Thus I joined the fight against the martial law troops....

On the afternoon of the 22nd, we brought the dead bodies from different hospitals to the square in front of the administration office of province.

There were about 50 corpses in all. ... As I was the chairman of the funeral committee, I made arrangement to lay corpses in coffins and identify them if anyone came to do so. As soon as the corpses were identified, they were buried.

The great trouble was that we could not get coffins in time. There were so many deaths that the stock of coffins ran out.

—Chong Yong Ho (The then student of Chonnam University)

In 1980 I was a student of Chonnam University, and belonged to the printing group of my university.

Having printed the handbills expressing our opposition to the extension of the May 17 emergency martial law and the stationing of the martial law troops and, taking them with us, we drove towards administration office of province by taxi at around three on the afternoon of the 18th. When we were near the bus terminal ... we saw fresh blood stains in many places of the pavement and many people removing them with rags. Seeing our groups, women who were passing by, said in one voice, "Why are you riding about like this at this hazardous time? Away with you at once!" Gathering from what they had said, we realized that only 30 minutes ago paratroopers beat and kicked students mercilessly, passing by.... We went into a shop nearby and, watching the movement in the street, saw that three military trucks passed by at about half past three. The trucks were laden with the people who knelt, their faces down to the floor and soldiers standing in the corners with a rifle in their hand.

The building of the MBC broadcasting station was burning and the martial law troops were stationed in front of the Chongsang School.

An armoured car of the martial law troops was driving swiftly through crowd in front of the school. It was at around eleven thirty of the 20th, I think. A primary schoolboy who did not manage to dodge it was run over by it....

On the 21st we rushed to the Kwangju tax

office, informed that the dead body of a woman was discovered in its dungeon. When we reached there, we saw people coming out, carrying her corpse.

The moment I saw the body I turned away my face in spite of myself. It was mangled so cruelly that I could not look at it in the face. Her face was so badly disfigured that it was difficult to identify it.

—Li Ryang Hyon (member of the planning board of the then students' struggle committee)

Between two and three o'clock on the afternoon of the 19th, seven or eight young people tied with each other by a rope in a line were being driven by paratroopers along Kumnam Street.

These young men were stripped to the shirt.

As the car ran fast or slowed down, some of them who were chained to the car fell down on the ground or were dragged.

The memory of the scene even now makes me sick.

At around five in the afternoon the both sides were facing with each other, clashes occurring between them. The police was sitting across the road in front of the Mudung Preparatory School to block the advance of demonstrators... Six paratroopers were chasing demonstrators along the road in front of the school and struck with club a woman who was not a student.

Seeing this, an old woman protested, saying "Why do you beat her?" The soldier cudgeled her too.... The soldiers broke into the school and

dragged out young people and beat them hard. They forced the two women to kneel on the ground, stripping them to the shirt.

Between 11:30 and 12 o'clock of the 21st over 20,000 citizens gathered near Building No. 1 on Kumnam Street facing the administration office of province.

The army threatened that they would open fire if the people move forward.

The soldiers were lined up in front of the administration office of province. A truck carrying demonstrators made a round of the fountain and returned. Seeing this people darted forth, shouting "Hey, they don't fire." Then the soldiers started firing.

Three citizens collapsed one after another on the ground.

There were few university students in the crowd. Most of them were middle school children and old people.

—Chong Hae Jik (teacher, aged 33)

At about half past four on the afternoon of the 19th the troops closed in on the city from the northeast direction, bayonet-fixed rifle in their hands. They caught three young men and came on, walking the prisoners stripped to the waist ahead of them... There were hundreds of people at the barricade, watching the on-coming soldiers. "Soldiers won't dare to stab us," they thought. The soldiers drew up to them and bayoneted them as if in bayonet drill. People collapsed here and there. At 8 a.m. of the 21st whole city seem-

ed to be in the state of war....

When I was back to Kumnam Street at 6 p.m. I learned that the person who had led the demonstrators sometime before died, getting some lead in him. People dispersed.

But Kumnam Street could not be crossed.

At the time even middle school students carried rifles with them.

—**Kim Hyo Jun** (ex-editor-in-chief of *Chonnam Ilbo*)

They mainly singled out young people and struck them on the head. As I have been living in Kwangju for decades of years, the young men I meet were almost the ones familiar to me. By occupation they were chef, barber or waiter at the restaurant. The soldiers struck them on the back of the head, the lower part of the belly, the back and then on the knee. They forced people to kneel down and chastised them like in the army.

The following event took place in front of the office of the east district, Kumnam Street on the morning of the 19th. A young woman was walking towards the Mudung Preparatory School from the direction of the YMCA building. The soldiers caught up with her and struck her. When a woman in her forties who was seeing her off dissuaded them from beating, they struck even her down. The students of the Mudung Preparatory School saw this, coming out after school and protested. The soldiers beat them, too, and caught some of them. Seeing this, the students of the

school raised their voices in protest. Several soldiers dashed into the building of the school, from which a loud scream was heard.

On the 21st, by Bank No. 1 in front of the building of the chamber of commerce and industry I saw that a student in drill attire—seemingly a high school student—fell, hit by a bullet, from the armored car which was racing towards the administration office of province building, flying the national flag.

—U Dong Jim (pseudonym, a journalist who covered the Kwangju incident)

After 6 o'clock on the afternoon of the 18th the martial law troops searched hotels and beat the employees there without rhyme or reason.

The martial law troops in the streets stopped running buses and dragged out and beat young people.

—Kim Yun Gi (pseudonym, a then reporter)

At around 4 o'clock on the afternoon of the 18th I was shooting the scene of demonstration on the ground from the top of the ad tower on the rooftop of a high-rise building near the rotary on Kwangnam Street.

The soldiers began beating people with truncheon and rifle butt indiscriminately. Beating of people continued on the rooftop below the tower. Soldiers whacked people on the head and shoulder, madly brandishing truncheon which looked like baseball bat.

I saw that blood spurted forth from the beaten

heads like a jet of water from a fountain. When I climbed down from the ad tower after a while I saw that the stairs were covered with blood. Blood trickled down to the bottom of the stairs as if spilled from a bucket.

—Chon Gye Ryang (chairman of the Association of Bereaved Families of the Victims)

On the 22nd I visited the Christian hospital which I had failed to do so the day before. I entered the mortuary, tearing myself away from the hands of the guard who detained me. I found the body of my son who was a 3rd-grade student of a high school lying there.... While disinfecting his body I learned that he died, his temple shot through.

—Pak Bok Nam (a bereaved family of a victim)

At around one o'clock in the afternoon I heard a shot outdoors. After a while I heard a voice saying that a boy who was playing in water was killed. I least imagined it was my boy. But people said the dead was called Kwang Bong who was 1st-grade pupil of a middle school. I was dazed and looked as if frozen stiff. Father went to see him. He found that the boy stripped to the underwear, was lying dead, hit by a bullet on the head.

—Mun Gong Yang (bereaved family)

On the 25th Chae Hak who was a high-school student rang me up.

Chae Hak said, "A friend of mine was killed. How can I remain a passive onlooker? If the

soldiers come on I will take refuge. Don't worry about me." I learned from the troops that there was a dead body of the unidentified boy of about 17 who was in drill attire and seemed to be a high-school boy.

They said, his was the unidentified No. 413, tomb No. 104 and coffin No. 94.... On June 9, I unearthed his tomb.

His chest was pierced through as if shot from behind.

—Pak Sun Rye (bereaved family)

I did not hear from Tae Hwan from the 23rd. His friends came and told me that in Chiwon-dong a bus was shot by the troops but the casualties were unknown yet.... From Chu police chief, my acquaintance, I learned that Tae Hwan was killed.

I identified him by the photograph of autopsy at the prosecutors' office. Digging up his body from the tomb I found that his jaw was gone and his chest was shot through.

—Kwon Gun Nam (bereaved family)

At about 9 a.m. of the 24th a volley was suddenly fired at our barrack housing five families in Songam-dong 58-2, Kwangju. After the shooting paratroopers came and searched the house. They discovered my brother, Kim Sung Hun, a worker aged 18 and Im Byong Chol aged 26 in the kitchen and walked them off.

The bodies of my brother and Kim Sung Hun who were shot to death were thrown into the sewer near the house. My brother's chest was

pierced through by bullets and his two arms bore the traces of stabs of bayonets.

The dead body of Im Byong Chol was discovered at the foot of the mountain beyond the house.

—Li Gwang Yong (aged 33, general manager of the Association of the Wounded in Kwangju)

On the 21st the hospital was full with the wounded who were brought in succession ... I called upon the citizens for aid. Dozens of people volunteered all at once.... In front of Kwangju station three persons fell on the ground, getting bullets at the same time, two of them died when we carried them to our ambulance. A high-school girl volunteered to donate her blood, so we gave her a lift to the Christian hospital.

Several hours later, another ambulance carried a dead body. It was the very high-school girl whom we had given a lift a while before.

I saw so many people killed and wounded that I grew strangely dull and came to little fear gunfiring and deaths.

Before the Sosan Gynaecologic Hospital I saw two persons lying on the ground bleeding, hit by bullets. Though we felt somewhat uneasy, we drove our car towards the wounded, counting on the red cross mark we bore. When we were 20 or 30 metres away from them, shots rang out, and a young man who was sitting behind me ... was shot through the right shoulder.

...We drove our car out of the sideway into the highway and stopped turning it towards the demonstrators. We ran up to the wounded and pulled

one of them to the ambulance. Two other persons and I rushed to the other wounded. When we lifted the wounded to put him into the ambulance, bullets rained on us.

I fell on the ground near the ambulance, feeling a sharp pain in the spine. The driver hastily put me in the car and drove away. Later I learned that three colleagues who were sitting in back seats were shot to death.

—Chong Jae Hui (aged 44, the wounded)

At about 3 p.m. of the 21st I got a bullet near the labour affairs office in front of the administration office of province. I live in 125-2, Pangnim-dong, Kwangju. An owner of a photo studio, I was among the people, carrying a camera in my hand.

The camera seemed to become the target of snipers' firing ... I fell on the ground, hit by the bullet in the waist.

Hong Du Pyo, a third-grade pupil of the Mudung Middle School who was standing beside me, too, collapsed, shot in the belly.

I cannot see why they fired at us, the onlookers of the demonstration.

—Nam Dong Song (pseudonym, then combat policeman)

On the 20th I saw two bodies in middle school uniform lying on the pavement across which the paratroopers went chasing the people. I ran up to them.

A middle school boy was already breathless, his chest having been trampled down by jack boots.

Another boy was groaning out, "Mother!" He soon breathed his last. I saw two young men in their twenties lying besmeared with blood in front of the gasoline stand. One of them was already dead and the other was on the verge of death. Let me take an instance of the paratroopers' outrages I witnessed. It was the 18th or 19th of the month, I suppose. Near Kumnam Street, an old woman sheltered a university student from being beaten by paratroopers. They struck her with truncheon. She collapsed on the spot.

The paratroopers' truncheons were 70 centimetres long, their head being as hard as a baseball bat. The following event happened at 1 p.m. of the 21st, I think.

A bus taking on board demonstrators was racing towards the paratroopers.

At the moment an officer took out his revolver and fired at the driver. The driver seemed to be hit by bullets and the bus went round twice and stopped near the fountain. The paratroopers fired a volley at the bus from the distance of 10 metres or so.

—Kim Sang Jip (a student of Chonnam University)

On the morning of the 19th the dead bodies of a boy and a girl student were discovered at the lavatory near the bus terminal. Three or four thousand demonstrators were chased by the paratroopers, who were joined by police cars.

Some twelve truckfuls of paratroopers came on and they bayoneted the people.

—Kim So-and-so (the then high school teacher)

On the evening of the 21st I visited the house of Mr. Kim Jung Hui to offer my condolence. His wife, Mrs. Choe Mi Na, who was in the eighth month of pregnancy died, getting a bullet. ... Being anxious about the late return home of her husband, she was standing in front of her home, waiting anxiously for the return home of her husband and was hit by a stray bullet in the face, they said.

I saw that her face was mangled.

—A certain Kim (a citizen)

I went again toward the Hanil Bank. A seemingly country woman and her son who seemed to be a middle school student were walking toward the troops, but not toward the demonstrators.... A soldier struck the on-coming student on the head with truncheon. I saw him beating her when she tried to shelter her son from being beaten.

I pitied them more than when I had seen a young man stabbed with bayonet.

—An Song Rye (matron of the Christian hospital)

During the Kwangju incident the heaviest casualties occurred on May 21, holiday, "the day of Christ's coming". That day our Christian hospital, a religious institution, was in operation as on weekday. I think we owe this miracle to God.... Our hospital with 350 beds was almost full, but

we received 137 wounded that day. They were stabbed, beaten or had bullet wound. Miss Pak Gun Hui, third-grade student of a high school, left our hospital after donating her blood and after a while was dead, hit by a bullet, and her dead body was brought in. This was one instance of countless tragedies that occurred that day. That day I became sceptical about human nature. I could not understand how people act that way. Some one was stabbed with bayonet, a big stab wound was below his jaw. Kim Yong Tae, an ex-officer who had been demobilized some months before, (aged 34 and lived 479-1, Unam-dong, North District, Kwangju) was enraged and joined demonstrators, saying, "I'll fight hand in hand with you." He got wounded by a stray bullet on Kumnam Street. This shows what outrages the paratroopers committed in repressing the insurgents.

The Background of the Outbreak of the Kwangju Incident and the Responsibility of the US

As the shocking testimonies of witnesses show, the Kwangju incident was an anti-popular and anti-national outrage committed by the National Army which rained bullets over the people brandishing rifles and sabres and at the same time it was a patriotic and democratic popular uprising of the people of Kwangju who rose up in a body in the resistance struggle.

Nevertheless, the truth of the Kwangju inci-

dent has been kept dark and distorted by the authorities.

On April 1st the government authorities equivocally qualified the Kwangju incident as "part of the endeavours for democratization" and made an apology before the nation. And they made public an all-inclusive measure to subsidize the bereaved families and the wounded with an aim to keep the truth of the Kwangju incident in the dark.

In this connection, Chon Gye Ryang, a victim of the Kwangju incident, censured the "Roh Tae Woo's government" for trying to obscure the truth of the Kwangju incident. He was quoted as saying, "The government measures are aimed at whitewashing the Kwangju massacre, an unheard-of criminal act, with material recompensation. For the thorough solution of the problem it is necessary to form a fact-finding team at the new National Assembly and thoroughly probe into the main cause of the Kwangju incident, the casualties and various rumors which were rife at the time."

For revealing the truth of the Kwangju incident the background of the incident should be clarified before the nation.

As to the background of the Kwangju incident, the government authorities attributed it to the disturbances by students, as is shown by the "truth of Kwangju incident" published by the ministry of defence on July 30, 1985, Defence Minister Yun Song Min's report to the National Assembly on June 7, 1985 and the statement on Kwangju incident issued by the Martial Law Command

on May 31, 1980 immediately after the incident. According to the view of the authorities, the incident was triggered off by students' disturbances and masterminded by a political force from behind. But, as is clearly proved by the testimonies of the witnesses in Kwangju, it goes without saying that the extremely ruthless suppression by the army caused the incident. The "pan-national movement promotion committee for the erection of a memorial to the victims of the May 18 Kwangju popular revolution and memorial services" refuted Defence Minister Yun's report as follows:

"After the October 26 incident the ardent trends of democratization which became the common concern of the nation were towards building a democratized country free from Yushin dictatorship with the early formation of a democratic government. The prime prerequisite for it was to lift the unwarrantable martial law and win back the essential freedom of speech. In the three days from May 14 to 16, 1980 the students from the Chonnam, Choson and many other universities of Kwangju clamoured their demands, the demands of the people, holding a peaceful demonstration in front of the administration office building of province in Kwangju and elsewhere. It is known to all that on May 17, Saturday, lectures were given in many universities as usual. Although the military had no grounds nor plausibility except for the lust for power, they declared extension of the martial law at dawn on May 17 and closed down universities and arrested democratic figures en masse.

This measure taken at dawn on the 17th became known to all on the morning of 18th. It was Sunday so that the students were mostly at home. That day diligent students of Chonnam University who were slow to take in the situation were going to pass the gate of the university guarded by the paratroopers to go to the library of the university. To think what outrages they had committed against the students who came to the university for study. Catching the students indiscriminately, they stripped them naked and struck them with rifle butt and killed them in cold blood.... Learning of this, the students held a demonstration in front of the gate of the Chonnam University on the morning of the 18th. This was precisely the beginning of the Kwangju resistance. ("The June 7 Statement of the Ministry of National Defence is not true but a concoction of lies," the March issue of *Sindong-A*.) Refuting the declaration of the Ministry of National Defence that "certain political force masterminded it" the committee said, "Suppose that certain political force egged the Kwangju citizens on to uprising or that it was the work of unsound elements. Imprisonment of a huge number of people and the ruthless investigation should have revealed the culprits who were to be punished as unsound elements. At the time the martial law authorities infiltrated disguised agents into the administration office of the province to brand the May revolution of Kwangju as the work of unsound elements, but the patriotic students arrested them and handed them over to the martial law authori-

ties. Their argument is an utter nonsense." The spy case mentioned here was known as the "poisonous injection incident" in those days. It was a queer murder case that in the administration office of the province a civilian insurgent was killed by the poisonous injection by the so-called unsound elements. It was disclosed by the testimonies given by Messrs. Cho Chol Hyon and Kim Jong Bae in the March issue of the monthly *Wolgan Choson* that the two persons involved in that murder case were the agents dispatched by the martial law army. In his statement, "The Truth of Kwangju Uprising" issued on December 14, 1987 Mr. Kim Dae Jung whom the authorities accused as the mastermind of the incident declared:

"In order to usurp the reins of government on the strength of the armed forces Chun Doo Hwan, Roh Tae Woo, Chung Ho Yong, Lee Hee Sung and Hwang Yong Si who had seized the real power of the military through the December 12 coup, met at the army headquarters on May 14, 1980 and discussed about the announcement of the extension of the May 17 Emergency Martial Law and the arrest of Kim Dae Jung and decided on harshly putting down the protest demonstrations of the Kwangju citizens which were expected to break out inevitably as they did at the time of Pusan and Masan incidents. According to this plan, the military junta dispatched two battalions of paratroopers in advance and made them commit barbarous atrocities of ruthlessly suppressing the peaceful demonstrations of students and citizens

of Kwangju, by beating them with clubs and stabbing them with bayonets and daggers on May 18, which caused heavy casualties. Their merciless and cruel oppressive outrages caused a large number of casualties.”

The testimony given by Chong Wung, the former commander of a division in the vicinity of Kwangju, makes Mr. Kim’s statement more plausible. He said:

“At that time the military authorities ordered me, a divisional commander, to occupy 10 universities, two newspaper companies and two broadcasting stations in Kwangju by May 16 and throw some 1,000 paratroopers into action on May 17. By this order I had 500 men of my division occupy the abovementioned establishments and dispatched 500 paratroopers to Chonnam and Choson Universities each. Let me add a few words to this. The prime movers of the December 12 coup incited the students of Kwangju inevitably to rise up in demonstration by arresting Mr. Kim Dae Jung. After having touched off the ‘Kwangju incident’, they intended to throw off their disguise and make public appearance, justifying the interference of the military in politics before the nation on the plea of social unrest.”

“This can be presumed”, he added, “from the fact that the gigantic power organ called the committee for national security appeared on May 31, four days after the end of the ‘Kwangju incident’ on May 27.”

This clearly shows that the Kwangju incident was a case of massacre masterminded by the lead-

ing figures of the "December 12 army purge coup" in an attempt to stay in power.

There are still a number of important unsettled issues concerning the Kwangju incident such as the question of rumours and death toll which was said to be 1,000 or 2,000.

Particularly the United States which holds the prerogative supreme command over the south Korean army should be brought to account for it by all means.

Concerning this, Mr. Lee Sang Woo wrote in the February issue of the monthly *Sindong-A*:

"The most dramatic act of the United States in its efforts to crack down on the Kwangju resistance siding with the ruling forces of south Korea was that it had authorized the transfer of troops for repression of insurgents. Enraged by the ruthless outrages of the airborne commando corps, the citizens formed the civilian force, taking arms on their own accord and the martial law troops withdrew to the outskirts of the city. As a result, Kwangju was actually in a chaotic condition on May 22 when General J. Wickham, commander-in-chief of the US forces in south Korea and concurrently commander-in-chief of the south Korea-US combined forces, agreed with ambassador Gleysteen to comply with the request of the south Korean martial law authorities and gave the green light to the transfer of part of the south Korean armed force under their command to the Kwangju area.

"They were four regiments of the 20th Division."

It is clear to all now that the United States had a hand in the massacre of Kwangju. It goes without saying that it should be officially called to account for it in the future and that the voices of the south Korean people demanding it will rise higher in future and their anti-American sentiments will ever mount.

“The rancor of Kwangju can never be recompensed with money. It can be settled only by the struggle for liberation and reunification. Mr. Paek Gi Wan remarked that ‘Kwangju’ in fact means the future of the country. His remark carried in the February issue of *Sindong-A* is meaningful.”

Roh Tae Woo must know that under the government ridden with falsehood which succeeded the anti-democratic, anti-popular, anti-national military dictatorial regime the grudge of Kwangju people will survive until the dictatorial power topples.

(*Toitsu Hyoron* No. 5, 1988)

REVIEW OF SOUTH KOREAN AUTHORITIES' "FORMULA FOR SOUTH-NORTH DIALOGUE"

—Logic of "Division-oriented Dialogue"—

Kang Dok Su

Ever since the national division into the north and the south and the establishment of the separate government, the successive governments of south Korea have had the monopoly of the reunification question, though they declared that it was the supreme task facing our nation. The reunification movement of the masses always have been the target of oppression as "a plot to overthrow the regime".

They proclaimed anti-communist ideology the basic policy and qualified the reunification question as an issue directly connected with "national security", and thus placed the reunification question under the monopoly of the government. Mr. Kim Gyong Jae from the Christian presbytery remarked, "Absolutization of the logic of cold war and anti-communist ideologies made the people accept 'national security', 'social security and order', 'national concord' and 'national harmony' as essential. This led to step up the repression of the masses ("Analysis of the civilian-level debate on reunification conducted by opposition

groups and students" by Kim Ho Jin, September 1988 issue of *Sindong-A*). Needless to say that the reunification movement has been greatly weighed down by all this.

Nothing has changed in the situation.

Even under such circumstances, the masses have pushed forward the reunification movement, describing the image of a unified state where the prime agent is the masses of people. In this course they have strived to realize national reunification by means of confederation practically and concretely. Formerly they confined themselves to insisting on the urgency of reunification conceptionally or sentimentally, but now rapid strides have been made in the reunification movement. When the reunification movement began to take deep root in the popular movement, the dialogues between the north and south authorities are likely to be brought into a stalemate again. Under such circumstances it is not meaningless to reexamine the reunification policy of the south Korean authorities. Now that the worldwide trends of detente have progressed to such an extent as not to allow retrogression and the conditions for national reunification are getting matured, it requires to be reconsidered, I think.

Monopoly over the Talks of National Reunification—The Unified Channel of Dialogue

So far the Roh Tae Woo's "government" did

not put forward the reunification policy to speak of. The "special declaration on south-north relations" was issued on July 7 last year, but, as it was disclosed later, it confined itself to the change of the south-north relations (in an extremely limited scale at that) and cannot be said to be on the reunification policy. It can be said to be more important that the basic approach of Roh's government towards the reunification question can be ascertained by examining the background of the July 7 declaration. Its stance is most clearly revealed in the so-called policy of "unified channel of dialogue". This was hastily advanced by the Roh's government in view of the rapid development of the popular movement for national reunification beyond its control. Let us consider it in detail.

Having the fatal drawback that it lacked validity and had weak support since he won only 36.6 per cent of votes in the presidential election, the Roh's government could not but play its trump card—the "northern policy" and "reunification policy"—riding on the new waves of the international detente, to plead its validity.

It is for this purpose that "President Roh" proposed to hold the south-north summit talks on April 21, 1988.

Meanwhile, the Council for National Reunification pushed forward with working out the plans for declassification of the north-related documents, broad discussion on national reunification, winning of the neutrals-led "internal force for national reunification" and establishment of new relations

with the north (report by the director of the Council for National Reunification, March 15, 1988). However, contrary to the expectation of the authorities, the student movements for the south-north co-hosting of the Olympiad and the south-north student talks brought about promotion of debate on national reunification and the movement for national reunification on a civilian level. So the south Korean government put forward the limited open-door policy of control of the debate on reunification question by "banning the reckless controversy on reunification" (Prosecutor General Li Jong Nam, June 3, 1988) and the policy of unifying the channel for the contact with the north.

As a matter of course, on June 9, the US State Department issued a statement in support of the policy of "unified channel of dialogue".

The July 7 declaration could not but give the impression that it was hastily cooked up to advocate the policy of the "unified channel of dialogue."

In its comment *Dong-A Ilbo* dated July 8, 1988 said, "The declaration has the internal political background. The government had to work out the new reunification formula on the government level, accepting inclusively the reunification formulas advanced by the masses".

It must be taken for granted that the July 7 declaration offers no prospect of reunification nor the blueprint of a reunified state.

It should not be overlooked that the policy of the "unified channel of dialogue" was advanced

on the plea of the “unified state policy” based on anti-communism, that is anti-north ideologies and “prevention of social disturbances”. This is the slogan put up by the successive dictatorial governments. Putting it in more concrete terms, Park Jung Hee put forward the plea of “defence of national security”, “the danger of communization” and “maintenance of public peace and order”. Added to this was the slogan “high-speed economic growth”. “National security”, “confrontation” and “growth” became the “state policy”.

As to the reunification question they pleaded “fostering of strength” and “priority of construction to reunification”.

It goes without saying that all other reunification plans were accused to be “sympathetic with communism” and “Leftist” and aimed at the “overthrow of the regime” and came under harsh oppression. Furthermore, although the July 4, 1972, North-South Joint Statement was signed, Park Jung Hee issued a separatist statement on June 23, 1973 the gist of which was “simultaneous entry into the UN” and the northern policy, and openly pursued the “two Koreas” policy. After Park Jung Hee’s death the “two Koreas” policy was taken over by the Choi Kyu Hah government and then by the “Chun Doo Hwan’s government” following the December 12, 1979, purge coup in the army and the May 17 coup the next year. The “Chun Doo Hwan’s government” which took over the heritage of the “Park’s government” sought to have monopoly over the talks about reunification and repressed those opposed to it, accusing them

as "compromising with communism" or as "Reds".

The "Roh's government", too, pursued the same policy. If there is any difference, it is that, as shown above, it is endeavouring to prevent the discussion of reunification issue, and reunification movement from spreading among the masses under the name of the "unified channel of dialogue".

In other regards, as to the attitude towards south-north dialogue for instance, there is no change whatsoever, and they are simply following the "line of dialogues" laid down by the "Park's government".

As a matter of course, dialogue is necessary for national reunification, no matter whether it is on the authorities' or the civilian level. Lack of either of them will lay a certain obstacle on the way to reunification.

Only when dialogues on both levels make successful progress, can the reunification question which is a national task be settled in accordance with the common will of the whole nation.

Needless to say, for the dialogue to be genuinely oriented towards reunification, above all, the attitude and approach to dialogue should be oriented to reunification. Particularly no restrictions should be placed on the debate on the reunification problems and anyone should be allowed to take part in it. It must not be monopolized by the rulers. But, viewed from the dialogue held so far, it cannot but be said that the south Korean authorities' attitude was not oriented to dialogue but rather to confrontation. And the debate of reunification question was considerably restricted.

Their attitude has been invariable since the beginning of the south-north dialogue at the time of the "Park Jung Hee government".

After the issue of the July 4, 1972, North-South Joint Statement, in fact, the "Park's government" shifted the south-north confrontation from "idea-oriented to practical confrontation" ideologically; converted the "brink-of-war confrontation to latent one" militarily; "moderate confrontation to positive one" politically; the "abstract confrontation to concrete one" socially and culturally, and the "partial confrontation to total one" diplomatically (No. 2 of *Kukto Tongil* for 1974).

In a word, this was declaration of switchover from "confrontation without dialogue to confrontation with dialogue". In other words, dialogue was used as an instrument of political confrontation. The same can be said about the present "Roh's government".

Functionalism, Theory on Phased Reunification

Already 17 years have passed since the south-north dialogue started and more than 100 contacts and dialogues were held through various channels. The only results of them were the aid to flood victims from the north in 1984 and the ensuing Red-Cross sponsored exchange of art troupes and the meeting of a small number of dispersed families in 1985.

It goes without saying that this is largely at-

tributable to the different approach to the dialogue of the southern and northern sides. Particularly the south Korean authorities' attitude was not congruous to the dialogue. This is proved by the experience.

The point is the "reunification policy" of the south Korean authorities.

The rather shapely one of the reunification proposals put forward by the successive governments of south Korea was the "proposal of democratic reunification for national reconciliation" Chun Doo Hwan advanced in his "keynote address" in January 1982. The proposal of "a tentative agreement on the basic relations between the south and the north" which could be said to be the gist of his address was vaunted as the concrete reunification proposal the south Korean side put forward for the first time. It can safely be said that the "Roh's government" has taken over this line.

The structure of this reunification policy is based on the so-called functional integration borrowed from international politics and pragmatic by-step theory. This was already reflected in the reunification policy of the "Park's government".

In the seminar held in the summer of 1970 under the auspices of south Korea the following was emphasized: first, the south-north reunification should be gradually effected functionally and by steps, secondly, simultaneous entry into the UN is the practical way and, thirdly, the stage of peaceful coexistence is necessary. According to the theory of functional integration in unifying different sovereign states it is difficult to maintain

peace by merging states by political approach and it is rather substantial and practical to maintain peace by setting up the international system of cooperation in nonpolitical fields, for instance, economic, cultural and humanitarian affairs. This is logically based on the following two premises: first, the relations of interdependence are formed through interaction between different societies, this brings the both parties the "benefit of merger", which promotes integration by bringing about the inseparable relations between them, secondly, the relations of functional cooperation in one field render great influence to the functional cooperation in other fields.

Mechanically applying this to the reunification issue and giving it concrete form, the government advanced the by-step theory.

According to the by-step theory, the prolonged by-step approach is necessary for the settlement of the reunification issue. This is an attempt to "prove" the infeasibility of political integration, describing reunification as a matter of distant future. For the purpose, the south Korean authorities went so far as to distort the concept of reunification. For instance, they introduced the concept of "reunification, in a broad sense" and speak of two kinds of reunification, that is, "political reunification" and "functional reunification".

They say that the former is the "reunification as the goal" or "reunification to be accomplished" and that the latter is the "reunification as a process" or "actually attainable reunification". And

they set the "functional reunification" as the practical goal.

Sin Do Song, the former director of the Council for National Unification, voiced the view of the authorities as follows:

"The goal of reunification efforts we should and can make at the present must be to actively promote such functional integration.... It is plain that a fairly long interim stage is necessary for ultimate integration" ("The idea and reality of Korea's reunification"). In other words, the reunification question was replaced with the question of nonpolitical intercourse.

The by-step theory is aimed at realizing functional integration in the "fairly long interim stage".

Concerning the by-step theory, Li Gyu Hak who was the director of the Council for National Unification of the Park's government said:

"The government is promoting the reunification policy, setting three stages. The first stage is to establish peace in Korea, the second stage is to restore the national homogeneity and the third stage is to form a unified government through south-north general elections" (February 12, 1974). In other words, the reunification is to go through the three stages—establishment of peace, nonpolitical and then political intercourses.

At first glance this may be taken as a "practical" approach to the settlement of the complicated reunification issue.

There is an opinion that it is proper to begin with the nonpolitical problems which are easy

to tackle, rather than political questions in which the interests of both sides are sharply shaped.

Is that true? It is not so in fact.

The stage of nonpolitical intercourse mentioned here corresponds to the "functional reunification", namely the "feasible reunification". As is shown above, this is the "reunification efforts we should and can make". The reunification efforts end here and do not go beyond. This is nothing short of the finalization of division, we should say.

Commenting on such attitude of the authorities, Professor Li Ho Jae, a political scientist, remarked that this was designed to impose the flexible view that "the improved state of division is better than the reunification which will bring about confusion, free from the rigid way of thinking of either complete division or 'complete reunification'" (the "ideal and reality of south Korean foreign policy").

A problem is that the authorities consider reunification as "confusion". Moreover, it cannot be overlooked that they try to cover the anti-national nature of infinite division with the phrase of "improved state of division".

The "improved state of division" is the gist of the "functional integration" and the "feasible reunification".

The attitude to the south-north dialogues of the south Korean authorities is oriented to confrontation because they are guided by the above-mentioned "reunification policy". In fact the south Korean authorities always tried to confine the south-north dialogue to the discussion of non-

political issues, and because of this the dialogue ended unsuccessfully.

Park Jung Hee, for instance, issued the "special declaration on diplomacy for peaceful reunification" on June 23, 1973, one year after the issue of the July 4 North-South Joint Statement, and put forward the "three principles of reunification" on August 15, 1974.

The keynote of the seven-point June 23 declaration was noninterference in each other's internal affairs, the simultaneous entry into the UN of the south and north, the opening of the door to the socialist countries (the "northern policy"). The three principles of reunification were the conclusion of the nonaggression treaty between the south and the north, the reopening of the south-north dialogue and the south-north general election based on the representation proportional to population. This is what they call the functional integration.

As mentioned above, Chun Doo Hwan talked about the "tentative agreement" whose main contents were incorporated in the "20-point plan of activities" made public by Son Jae Sik, the then director of the Council for National Unification in 1982. It was no more than a proposal for south-north intercourse for the "functional integration". As mentioned above, it is evident that these proposals intended for the permanent national division, but not for political integration. Roh's government followed this course in its "reunification policy".

This is evident from the fact that the July 7

declaration and Park Jung Hee's "reunification policy" are similar and that the reunification policy of the Roh's government "is based on Chun Doo Hwan's proposal for democratic reunification for national reconciliation and pursues flexibility in its execution" (*Choson Ilbo* dated June 7, 1988). Such attitude has been clearly revealed in the south-north dialogue. Good evidence of this is the economic talks proposed persistently by the southern side. The economic talks were held five times between November 1984 and November 1985.

At the talks the northern side proposed the development of resources, formation of joint commissions for industry, technology, agriculture, and fishing industry and the exchange of commodities, transport and communication, bank operations, the broad and many-sided cooperation between the south and north, joint venture and joint development. But the southern side proposed to effect exchange of commodities (trade) and mutual visits of people by steps, which was remindful of trade with foreign countries. This is not intended to reunify the country, by dispelling distrust and misunderstanding between the south and north and further establishing the relation of cooperation in practice, but to substitute the question of limited intercourse between the south and the north for national reunification issue.

The same can be said with regards the "special bill on south-north intercourse" adopted at the Cabinet meeting held on February 11. It provided for the visit to south Korea of overseas Koreans

having no south Korean citizenship and the economic exchange including trade between the south and north and mutual visits of people. Its contents are like those of a bill for foreign trade.

As for the economic intercourse, for instance, it is ostensibly given special treatment as transfer of goods within the nation, but in fact the laws on foreign trade such as foreign exchange control law and foreign capital induction law are to be applied as they are. It may be as well interpreted to be intended not as a bridge to reunification, but for creation of the "improved state of national division".

How did the matter stand with the preliminary contacts for the south-north parliamentary talks which started from August 19 last year? Originally the aim of these talks was to open the prospect for reunification by realizing the south-north co-hosting of the Olympiad. So, the northern side brought up as the items of agenda for the meeting the question of co-hosting of the Olympic Games, and at the same time the question of publishing the declaration of the south-north non-aggression to dispel distrust and misunderstanding between the south and north, easing of tension and the southern side's proposal for peace. The point was to pave the way to reunification. But the southern side insisted on discussing only the question of north's participation in the Olympics and made the separatist proposal that "With the Olympic flag flying ahead, the teams of the south and the north, each holding their own flags, parade side by side in the opening and closing ceremon-

ies.”

As for the question of nonaggression declaration the southern side merely suggested “recommending” it to the both governments. Originally it is the duty of the parliament to solve all social affairs “politically”. Therefore, the parliamentary talks should treat political issues from beginning to end.

Nevertheless the southern side endeavoured to discuss only humanitarian and economic issues, alleging that the nonaggression declaration was a matter to be dealt with by the governments. But the talks were suspended owing to the “Team Spirit” joint military exercises.

“The July 7 Declaration” and “Commonwealth of Regimes”

The “special declaration on south-north relations” issued by the Roh’s government did not go beyond the bounds of these “reunification formulas”. There is no need to consider their substance in detail. It will suffice to introduce following remarks.

“The 4th, 5th and 6th points of the July 7 declaration are in essence same with the Park Jung Hee’s June 23, 1973, declaration and its 1st and 3rd points respectively correspond to the 7th and 14th points of the 20-point plan of activities made public by Son Jae Sik, the ex-director of the Council for National Unification in 1982.” “Therefore there is nothing new in the July 7 declaration,

and 'President Roh' only voiced what was spoken by Messrs. Park Jung Hee, Li Hu Rak and Son Jae Sik." (National Assemblyman Li Chan Goo from the Party for Peace and Democracy).

The "President" himself admitted this. Prior to the publication of the "declaration" in his interview with foreign reporters at the end of June Roh Tae Woo said that the future south-north relations would be based on the "tentative agreement on south-north basic relations" outlined in Chun Doo Hwan's proposal of "democratic reunification for national reconciliation". Two days before the issue of the "declaration" the "Prime Minister", too, said at the session of the National Assembly that "the government makes the former democratic reunification for national reconciliation" its basic policy.

In short this means that there is nothing new in it. Nevertheless the south Korean authorities vaunted it as "a new turn in conception and thinking", or as "epochal reunification proposal".

It won't be amiss to know that the following critical remark is voiced against the attitude of the south Korean authorities. The medley of statements, proposals, recommendations and views published according to the requirements of the definite situations is described as if it were the reunification policy, but it cannot be said to be the reunification policy in the true sense of the word (*Dong-A Ilbo* dated July 1, 1988).

This is the remark of Dong Hun, the former vice-director of the Council for National Unifica-

tion. As it is the remark made by the person who was once in charge of the reunification affairs, it came as a bitter criticism to the Roh's government.

It is noteworthy that Roh Tae Woo's "declaration" is also based on the "theory of by-step reunification". Although the "declaration", too, refers to the national community, it indicates three-step way—the nonpolitical integration (economic, social and cultural), political integration and reunification, as the "by-step way of reunification". The by-step theory is designed for the "change in the north" as a breakthrough. It is designed to "promote the opening of door to the north Korean society". The concrete step taken for this purpose was the adoption of the northern policy.

Originally it was Park Jung Hee who advanced the northern policy for the first time. He put it forward in the June 23, 1973, declaration.

Park Jung Hee endeavoured to use south-north dialogue for the northern policy and pursue it to perpetuate Korea's division, while Roh Tae Woo schemed to promote the northern policy first to create favourable international climate and then start south-north dialogue and thus keep Korea divided. This was revealed by the policy speech Roh Tae Woo delivered on October 4 last year. In his speech he stated that "the improvement of relations with the northern countries is intended to promote opening of the door of the north". Pak Chol On from the Blue House, Roh Tae Woo's right-hand man in charge of the execution of the

northern policy, was more outspoken. He did not conceal that the aim of the northern policy was "to change the internal system of the north and promote opening of the door of the north to the outside" (the September issue of *Sindong-A* for 1988).

What is common in their statements is that both of them consider the south-north relations as those of "confrontation". There is the view that the "declaration" qualified the future relations between the south and north as the switchover from "antagonism" to "trust", from "confrontation" to "cooperation" and from "competition" to "fellowship", but viewed from the aim of the "northern policy" it cannot be said to be free from the outworn cliché of the "Park's government" about the changeover from the "confrontation without dialogue" to the "confrontation with dialogue".

Why then did the south Korean government adopt functionalism and by-step theory in its "reunification formula" and concept of "dialogue"? In short, it is because it considers the south-north reunification as the integration of the two systems into one.

The attempt to merge the two different regimes into one, on the one hand, gives rise to the antagonistic relations "who beats whom" and on the other, lays stress on the necessity of by-step approach such as "Beginning with the solution of the nonpolitical affairs in which conflicts of interests are little".

Viewed from the uncompromising viewpoint

of "Who beats whom" the word "establishment of peace" for the relaxation of tension between the south and the north, for instance, sounds like hinting national division. The humanitarian or economic intercourse, too, will have to be confined within definite limits with primary consideration given to the "interests of the allies".

Even if convergence takes place through the intercourse based on functionalism as the authorities suppose, it will run up against political barrier at once. In other words, leap from the "functional reunification" or "feasible reunification" to the "reunification to be accomplished" is hardly possible.

At first glance south Korea's reunification policy seems to be reasonable and practical. But it is doomed to failure in the face of the most important question, that is, political detente. Today in south Korea heated debate on national reunification is held on a civilian level, which refutes the "reunification policy" which inevitably leads to the finalization of national division. Particularly it can be said to be an important change that the image of a unified state, that is the reunification by south-north confederation, began to be described in detail, going beyond the bounds of ambiguous arguments.

The Roh's government is expected to come out with a new reunification policy to counter the "debate on reunification question arising among the masses". It was hinted that it must be oriented toward the "commonwealth of states" or "commonwealth of regimes". Li Hong Gu, director of

the Council for National Unification, often made remark to that effect, which was apparently intended for publicity.

It is not put forward so far because opinions did not converge. Anyway it is difficult to expect the policy acceptable to the masses unless they renounce the approach and argument mentioned above.

It is desirable to break free from the reunification argument which has been followed since the Park's government.

(*Toitsu Hyoron*, No. 5, 1989)

THE GOVERNMENT'S REUNIFICATION FORMULAS

Kang Dok Su

(1)

To greet the 1990s as the age of national reunification is the unanimous desire of the 70 million Korean people. As is generally known, the year of 1992 is expected to be marked as a milestone of the reunification movement. Upsurge of the reunification movement of the south Korean people in 1988 and 1989 offered a hope and prospect for the path ahead of the nation aspiring after reunification. The reunification movement is developing into a mass movement involving the people from all walks of life in south Korea, and they advocate a common proposal for reunification by means of confederation. This fact more brightens the prospect.

Meanwhile, north Korea has long since advocated the proposal for reunification by means of confederation on condition that the north and the south recognize and respect each other's social system. In 1988, it proposed to the United States and the south Korean authorities the four principles to guarantee peace and put forward a package peace proposal for arms reduction, prerequisite

to the settlement of reunification question. This is intended for opening the door of reunification in 1995 and scheduled for the withdrawal of the US troops from south Korea and a lasting peace on the Korean peninsula.

Formidable obstacles, however, still stand in the way of national reunification. The United States and Roh Tae Woo's government are still following the "two Koreas" policy. The Roh's government's northern policy aims to isolate the north internationally and further, to disintegrate the north by sending "wind of freedom" to it, namely, to realize "reunification" by destroying the regime of the north and extending their dictatorial regime to the north. Needless to say, this hostile policy hinders reunification.

Now the world is in a new upheaval. Changes in the east Europe show that the result of Yalta agreement by which the world had been divided into specific spheres of influence underwent a sudden change. This presses for the emergence of a new world order to replace the cold war system which had been established after World War II and has crumbled. It is hoped that the new order is oriented toward the order of liberation which brings about the downfall of imperialism and liquidation of all forms of colonialism and by which all the nations maintain their independent national dignity on an equal footing.

Such being the situation, the question of Korea's reunification poses itself as an urgent task to put an end to the cold war. Without solving this question would it be impossible to establish

a new world order in reality. Unless Korea is reunified, the state of cold war will remain as ever in the Far East and there is a danger of its spreading again over the world.

The European situation is changing, but expansion of armaments continues in the Far East. Strong voices are raised for establishing the system of regional cooperation in the Far East, but, without the solution of Korean question, it is hardly feasible.

This is why the settlement of the question of Korea's reunification is required urgently as never before.

Needless to say, this pressing task is primarily posed to the Korean people. A dramatic change in the world situation does not bring about national reunification of its own accord. The Korean people are rather assigned the world-historic mission to contribute to establishing a new world order by achieving independent national reunification.

Now that the world order is going to change with the likely advent of a new era of Korea's reunification, it will be advisable to sum up the reunification formulas (proposals) advanced by the south Korean authorities which had persistently stood and might stand regrettably, in the future, in the way of reunification. To have a clear idea of the obstacles in the way of reunification is essential for the settlement of the question. First of all, it is necessary to overhaul the evolution of the reunification policy of the south Korean authorities.

Formation of the Structure of National Division and the “March-North Unification” Formula

Korea's division into two parts originated from the Soviet and US armies' stationing in the north and the south respectively in 1945. Until the establishment of a separate government in south Korea in 1948, the visit and correspondence across the 38th parallel, though unsatisfactory, were feasible between the north and the south.

National division became definite with the establishment of a separate government in south Korea and was further consolidated by the Syngman Rhee government's “policy of march-north unification” and the suppression of the reunification forces by the south Korean authorities.

The Soviet and US armies were stationed with the 38th parallel as a demarcation line as a temporary measure to settle the postwar problems after World War II. But its nature changed with the execution of the US postwar strategy. It became a symbol of the cold war in the Far East and converted the 38th parallel into a “frontier”.

Needless to say, the US Military Government in south Korea played a decisive role in it. In addition, it must be remembered that the US policy towards south Korea was carried out through the anti-popular policies of Syngman Rhee and his party.

The United States used the movements against

trusteeship, for separate election and separate government launched persistently by Syngman Rhee and other reactionary forces (the "Korean Democratic Party") as an excuse to break up the USSR-US Joint Commission which had agreed on Korea's reunification and independence.

The movement against trusteeship and for separate election and separate government gave the US side the possibility of renouncing unilaterally the decision of the Conference of Soviet, US and British Foreign Ministers (held in Moscow) which stipulated reunification and independence of Korea on the basis of the international agreement reached at the Potsdam Conference. Thus, the United States broke off the Moscow Three Foreign Ministers' Conference and froze the division of the Korean peninsula by establishing a separate government in south Korea.

As a matter of course, the south Korean government established in this way was extremely anti-communistic since it was a product of the cold war. Its anti-communist attitude was clearly revealed concerning the reunification question.

The first official statement of the south Korean government on the reunification question can be found in the speech delivered by Syngman Rhee on August 15, 1948, in which he proclaimed the establishment of a separate government in south Korea. It boils down to: "1. The south Korean government is the sole legitimate one which has sovereignty over the whole Korean peninsula as stipulated in the constitution. 2. Election shall be held in the north to fill 100 seats which

remain unoccupied in the National Assembly. 3. South Korea has a right to restore sovereignty over the north even by force of arms." (*White Paper on Unification*, Reference Material of Legislation, No. 146.)

"The Unification Policy of Our Country Traced" carried in the *Report to National Assembly* which was issued in 1967 summarized the reunification policy of the Syngman Rhee's government as follows:

"It is necessary as a rule to hold the UN-supervised separate election only in north Korea, to unify by marching to the north or to hold an election in north Korea alone, but a general election across the country can also be held. As provided in the constitution of south Korea, it should be the UN-supervised free election, based on the representation proportional to the population in the north and the south. The UN-supervised election should be held after the withdrawal of all the communist armies from the whole region of north Korea. This was the unification proposal set forth at the Third National Assembly which made it the state policy to extend the sovereignty of south Korea. And 'march-north unification' (northward expedition with the UN forces, northward expedition in cooperation with the United States, or singlehanded northward expedition), south-north reunification by south Korea on the basis of its constitution were advocated by the Liberal Party in 1959." (*Report to National Assembly* dated June 25, 1967.)

The reunification policy pursued by the Syng-

man Rhee government can be summarized as the proposal of the UN-supervised election in the north and the south (or in the north alone) and the proposal of "march-north unification" by force of arms. In either case, it means that the south absorbs and merges the north. The proposal of the UN-supervised general election, (a separate election in the north), has rather the character of a slogan intended for abroad, and, in fact, the basic proposal is the one for "march-north unification".

The Syngman Rhee government proclaimed "march-north unification" to be its state policy in January 1947 and really provoked the Korean war under its slogan.

Syngman Rhee conveyed to Truman the official standpoint of south Korea on July 19, 1950, for the first time after the start of war, saying that "the operational objective of the UN forces should not be confined to restoring the prewar state but, is to achieve reunification by northward march." On August 17 the same year the United States also declared that the objective of the UN forces is to achieve reunification by south Korea on the Korean peninsula (W. Austin, the US ambassador to the UN).

Even after the Korean war, the Syngman Rhee government insisted upon the "march-north unification" by force of arms. Setting forward the 14-point proposal at the Geneva Conference held according to the armistice agreement, Foreign Minister Byon Yong Tae insisted on the UN-supervised general election based on the representation pro-

portional to the population and the UN Forces also insisted on the "UN-supervised free election" and broke off the conference unilaterally.

As is pointed out, the Syngman Rhee government held fast to "the proposal of single-handed march-north unification and that of the UN-supervised general election in the north alone as a reunification proposal", after the Geneva Conference (*Study of Reunification Question* Vol. 1, published by Foreign Policy Research Institute, Foreign Ministry) and did not give up the "march-north unification".

In his speech at the US Congress in July 1954, Syngman Rhee said that "a preventive war should be fought to destroy the heart of the Soviet Union before the increase of its nuclear attack forces." This was by no means fortuitous.

However, they could not throw the country into the flames of war again. The consolidation of dictatorial regime effected by force during the war provoked antipathy among the ruling circles and caused scramble for power. As the government lost the confidence of the people, it would have been toppled if it had provoked another war.

In its third session held on November 11, 1954, therefore, the National Assembly adopted a resolution: "It is the national policy to extend the south Korean sovereignty by holding the UN-supervised election after the withdrawal of all the communist armies from the whole region of north Korea." In 1959, the Liberal Party of Syngman Rhee insisted again upon the march-north unification by

force of arms, but in effect it aimed to save confusion within their regime in the then political chaos and divert the people's attention elsewhere.

The mass demonstration held in Masan in March 1960 in protest to the fraudulent election triggered off the April 19 uprising, which at last overthrew the Syngman Rhee government. It came as the declaration of a total bankruptcy of the policy of "march-north unification" by force of arms and, at the same time, meant the first upsurge of the people's reunification movement after the war.

Chang Myon government which replaced Ho Jong-led interim government formed after the overthrow of the Syngman Rhee government explained its standpoint, stating that "It gives up the reckless and pointless slogan of march-north unification and pursues the policy of holding the UN-supervised north-south general election." (The 7th point of the foreign policy, August 24, 1960.)

As a result, the "march-north unification" advocated by Syngman Rhee went bankrupt and "the UN-supervised general election" was advanced again as the official reunification proposal. But it aimed to thwart the mounting aspiration of people for reunification under the name of UN.

"A unified state" to be established through the UN-supervised general election was to "outlaw the Communist Party" (Kim Hak Jun, *Evolution of Reunification Formula in North and South Korea*).

Viewed in this light, it is justly remarked that "The Chang Myon government made no step forward from the reunification policy of the Syngman

Rhee government" (*Ibid.*).

In 1961, however, the reunification movement of the people made rapid strides. On January 9 was formed the National Front for Reunification of the Fatherland whose program was to accomplish the historic tasks of national reunification based on the national self-determination and on the 25th of the same month the Central Council for Independent National Reunification embracing 35 political parties and social organizations set up at last. The people raised their voices for independent reunification and for reunification through negotiation.

The editorial in the *Hanguk Ilbo* dated January 5 pointed out that the people's desire for reunification "mounted so high that it cannot be controlled any more" and the editorial in the same newspaper dated January 15 wrote "It cannot but be said that the Chang Myon government's attitude toward reunification reversed to that of the Syngman Rhee government."

Under these circumstances students expressed their determination to achieve reunification in their declaration issued on the occasion of the first anniversary of the April 19 Popular Uprising. The students of Seoul University embraced in the League of Students for National Unification adopted a resolution on holding talks between north and south Korean students on behalf of the participants of the meeting of representatives held on May 4 and launched a movement for holding the talks of north and south Korean students on May 20. The reunification proposal of

the Chang Myon government was acceptable to none.

Reversion to the Formula for Reunification by Prevailing over Communism

The “march-north unification” put forward by the Syngman Rhee government and the “UN-supervised general election” advanced by the Chang Myon government were no other than the formula for reunification by prevailing over communism in the sense that both of them aimed to absorb the north into the south Korean regime.

The April 19 uprising meant the bankruptcy of formula for reunification by prevailing over communism but Park Jung Hee reversed to it, by staging a coup d’etat on May 16, 1961. The Park Jung Hee military dictatorial clique set up a regime of oppressive law based on the anti-communist law, banned all the debate on reunification and suppressed the reunification movement.

In his biography the *Path to Be Followed by Our Nation*, Park Jung Hee declared that “the negotiation with the Communist Party means the beginning of defeat”. He said that all were a silly empty-talk except the reunification by prevailing over communism. He clarified his intention to follow the policy which had been advocated since the time of Syngman Rhee, saying “Reunification is a matter of urgency but its method cannot be altered” (November 3, 1964). He put forward the

“theory of fostering real ability”, saying “For national reunification real ability should be fostered to counter communism”. This served as the theoretical ground for the theory of the “priority of construction to reunification”.

Nevertheless, Park Jung Hee had no clear-cut reunification proposal or reunification policy. As the international situation surrounding reunification on the Korean peninsula greatly changed in the second half of the 1960s, the Park Jung Hee’s government was compelled to put forward the reunification proposal to cope with it. It was faced with a new situation, the UN which had sided with one side of the national division underwent a great change in its composition and the questions of dissolution of the “UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea” and withdrawal of UN forces were put on the agenda and submitted to a vote in 1966. These changes in the UN reflected the change in the then international situation.

Under this situation the Park Jung Hee military government tried a new approach to the reunification question. As the initial step, it came up with *White Paper of Unification* in October 1966. An open hearing on the reunification question was held at the National Assembly in December and the Council for National Unification set up in 1969.

The *White Paper of Unification* clearly indicated that the National Assembly intends to deal with the reunification question for the first time in the history of parliamentary politics (*Basic*

Materials for Question of Security and Unification published by Dong-A Ilbo Company). This revealed the anti-national stand of the successive governments which were extremely passive concerning the reunification question, apart from the Syngman Rhee government's extremist march-north unification and, at the same time, showed the crisis of the Park Jung Hee government in the reunification question.

Concerning the reunification policy of the Park Jung Hee government the *White Paper of Unification* pointed out: 1. There is no change in the proposal for the UN-supervised general election based on the representation proportional to the population. 2. The independent peaceful reunification free from foreign interference after the withdrawal of foreign troops and reunification through north-south negotiations and cultural exchanges are a camouflage tactics of north Korea. 3. Modernization should be sped up and the internal system completed to accumulate forces and acquire power to defeat the north. 4. There can be no practical way out unless a radical change takes place in the international situation.

If there is anything different from the former governments it is that the Park Jung Hee government put forward the "theory of fostering real ability" which aimed to prolong the division by recognizing the division as a fait accompli. In his New Year address made in January 1965, Park Jung Hee said: "For national reunification economic construction should be stepped up by promoting modernization." In the press interview

held in June of the year when the ROK-Japan treaty was signed, he stated: "The south-north reunification question should be discussed in the second half of the 70s". As slogan of the "priority of construction to reunification" shows, his view lacked the most important point that reunification is a matter of urgency essential for the survival of the nation.

Perpetuation of Division—"Two Koreas Policy"

In the 1970s, the situation surrounding the Korean peninsula showed rapid change. The normalization of relations between the United States and China, the start of detente between the United States and Soviet Union and the evident tendency of "Koreanization" of the question of the Korean peninsula by Nixon's doctrine—all this brought blame on the hostile attitude taken by the Park Jung Hee military dictatorial regime which leaned to anti-communism and caused the rapid spread of the public opinion in support of the achievement of national reunification.

To cite one example, according to a survey of public opinion conducted by the Council for National Unification from September to December 1969, 90.6 per cent of the asked persons replied, "Reunification should be achieved by all means" and 80 per cent of them demanded that it be realized as soon as possible. The Park's government was compelled to give up the formulas for

“unification by prevailing over communism,” the undisguised confrontation stance it had assumed so far.

At the meeting in commemoration of August 15 in 1970, Park Jung Hee proposed to the north “good-will competition”, which hinted toleration of the government of the north and changeover to the policy of the north-south “peaceful coexistence”. The Park’s government was also aware that the public opinion supporting national reunification was prevalent.

This reflected the change of the US policy toward south Korea. The treatise Abramowitz, the former Assistant Secretary of Defence, wrote in 1971-72 at the request of the Department of Defence, gives an account of the gist of the changeover of the policy.

He pointed out: “South Korea is required to change its ‘policy toward the north’, namely, they should recognize north Korea as it is and be ready to allow north Korea to take part in some and all discussions. This, in essence, means for south Korea to make a complete turn-face from the stand it had held fast to for about 18 years and accept some of the proposals put forward by the north on many occasions as the basis of negotiations” (*Trend of Thaw on the Korean Peninsula and Big Powers*).

To put it in concrete terms: 1. South Korea should consent to north-south negotiations, 2. Negotiations eventually should aim for the simultaneous entry of the north and the south to the UN, 3. A conference of northeast Asian countries

(six countries concerned) should be held. As he admitted himself, the point is that the proposal "admitted Korea's division".

With the changeover in the US policy toward Korea, the Park's government consented to north-south negotiations advocated consistently by north Korea. The preliminary talks of north and south Korean Red-Cross organizations were held from September 20, 1971, the north-south high-level talks held in May and June 1972 and the historical north-south joint statement made public on July 4, 1972.

This statement showed that the south Korean authorities themselves admitted that they could no longer insist upon the formula for reunification by prevailing over communism and the "priority of construction to reunification" as they did in the past no matter what the political backgrounds may be, namely, no matter what the intention of the United States and Park's government may be.

North Korea, however, had taken an attitude of holding fast to the three principles of national reunification clarified in the north-south joint statement, which was a great obstacle to the achievement of their purpose. Clamouring that "our fate cannot be risked by scrap of paper", the Park Jung Hee and his party, placed in a dilemma, enforced "October revitalization" on the pretext of "security crisis" or "necessity of regulating the regime", which brought the north-south talks to a deadlock, and prohibited all debates on reunification and established their mono-

poly over them.

In his press interview held early in January 1972, Park Jung Hee said: "It is difficult to achieve the reunification of our country until the objective situation for it matures.... Silla unified the country in 120 years following the endeavour of its King Munmu.... We should not make haste" (*Choson Ilbo* dated January 12, 1972). This showed that the military dictatorial government had no intention of reunifying the country.

The "special statement on diplomatic policy for peaceful reunification" made public by Park Jung Hee on June 23, 1973, disclosed their stand opposed to reunification. The gist of the special statement is: 1. Noninterference in each other's internal affairs, 2. The simultaneous entry of the north and the south into the UN, 3. Opening of door to unhostile communist countries, etc. Explaining the background of the statement, Kim Jong Pil, the then Prime Minister said: "We do not want two states for one nation, but if it is for peace, south Korean policy is to recognize temporarily the actual division" (*Yomiuri Shim-bun* dated June 23, 1973). As he pointed out, they openly made "two Koreas" their policy.

Noteworthy here is that the statement revealed that the Japanese government was another obstacle to reunification on the Korean peninsula. Concerning Park Jung Hee's "statement", Mizuno Kiyoshi, the then vice-minister of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, said: "Frankly speaking, it is the outcome of the persuasion by the Japanese Foreign Ministry. The statement luckily took that

shape owing to the good understanding of the south Korean authorities (*Mainichi Shimbun* dated September 7, 1973). This shows that the Japanese government was deeply involved in the "two Koreas" policy.

As seen above, it can be said that the "special statement" faithfully followed the changeover of the US policy toward Korea and served as the base of the future reunification policy of the south Korean authorities. The June 23 statement underlies the northern policy and the proposal for south-north exchange put forward by the Roh Tae Woo's government, as will be referred to later.

By the way, the June 23 statement hinted another change in the reunification policy of the south Korean authorities. As Kim Jong Pil said, they tried to make the division fait accompli under the pretext of peace. In other words, the theory of the priority of peace to reunification based on "two Koreas" policy was substituted for the old theory of the "priority of construction to reunification" based on the formulas for reunification by prevailing over communism.

This is revealed in the fact that the "three principles of reunification" published (on August 15, 1974) following the June 23 statement call for building up the system of coexistence with the "establishment of peace". In his press interview given on January 18, 1978, Park Jung Hee himself clearly remarked: "Our basic attitude toward reunification is to maintain coexistence without fighting each other until conditions for it will

mature. Our reunification policy is priority of peace to reunification.”

It can be said that the proposal for the conclusion of a nonaggression pact between the north and the south (January 1974) and that for the formation of an organization of north-south civilian economic cooperation (June 1976) and others were all based on the theory of “priority of peace to reunification”.

It must be mentioned that the theory of “priority of peace to reunification” had been stressed to counter the policy of giving priority to the solution of political and military affairs advocated consistently by north Korea. The so-called theory of functional integration served as the theoretical ground for the “priority of peace to reunification”.

The debate on the issue has been held in earnest since the summer of 1970. It can be summarized: 1. Since the north and the south became heterogeneous, national reunification is infeasible in a short time. 2. Hence it is necessary to form the relations of functional coexistence between the north and the south and give rise to common interests through gradual exchanges over a fairly long period. 3. To put it into more concrete terms this process cannot but be by-step extension of north-south exchange. 4. This process can be guaranteed only by the establishment of peace between the north and the south.

The theory of function at integration serves so far as the theoretical basis for the reunification policy of the south Korean authorities. In '80s,

however, this theory was strongly challenged by the debate on national reunification on a civilian level (*Toitsu Hyoron* No. 1, 1990).

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In 1980s, the debate on national reunification on a civilian level came to the fore in south Korea. This can be said to be the interim summing-up of the reunification movement launched vigorously by the south Korean people after the country's division.

After the country's division noteworthy proposals for reunification were advanced in south Korea: "Seven principles of peaceful reunification of the north and the south by 15 young members of the Constitutional Assembly (they were arrested in April 1949 in connection with the so-called case of "Leftist" organization in the National Assembly), the reunification proposal published by the Progressive Party in its inaugural meeting in November 1956 and that proposed by the Progressive Party leader Cho Bong Am in his treatise *The Path to Peaceful Reunification* (he was executed on a charge of his being pro-communist) (the October 1957 issue of *Chungang Jongchi*).

After the popular uprising on April 19, 1960, important proposals for democratic reunification based on the principles of independence and peace were set forward by the Socialist Mass Party, the Social Party and the Central Council for Indepen-

dent National Reunification. It is noteworthy that particularly in this period the entire people rose up for the realization of north-south students' talks proposed by the students and the reunification movement developed to a mass movement. It is remarkable that the formulas for reunification based on neutrality such as the proposal for reunification based on Austria-type neutrality appeared. This also characterized the situation.

However, the important point is that these reunification formulas failed to receive national consensus concerning the essential and fundamental problems such as the prime agent of reunification movement, the principle of reunification, etc. This can be said one of the main reasons why the reunification movement was ultimately suppressed and dull in 1960s due to the Park Jung Hee's coup although the mass movement developed rapidly to the reunification movement after the Syngman Rhee regime was overthrown by the April 19 uprising.

Later, the July 4 joint statement issued in 1972 confirmed the three principles of independence, peaceful reunification and great national unity in the name of the entire nation. This was of very important significance. All the proposals related to the reunification problem were appraised with the July 4 joint statement as a yardstick and the reunification movement was oriented toward the implementation of the joint statement.

Some people underestimate or deny the significance of the July 4 joint statement, overstressing that the south Korean dictatorial government

consented to the July 4 joint statement to strengthen their dictatorial regime following the US strategy.

This is a too biased and groundless judgement formed in disregard of the significance of the fact that the Korean nation came to possess the principles of reunification common to the north and the south.

In fact, the July 4 joint statement meant a declaration to the world that any way of settlement of the reunification problem disagreeing with the principles laid down in the joint statement, whether it may be the approach to the reunification issue of any force including outside forces, is hostile to the Korean nation and leads to the encroachment of the right to national self-determination with imposition of their interests on the Korean nation.

Let us see the reunification policy of the south Korean authorities in the '80s.

The First "Systematic Reunification Proposal"

As mentioned above, the south Korean government's policy for reunification in the '70s was run through with functionalism in its contents.

Even after the collapse of the Park Jung Hee regime, its reunification policy was followed as it was.

To mention for reference's sake, the Choi Gyu Ha's interim government which came in office

after the overthrow of the Park Jung Hee's government, too, advocated the "functional integration". At the session of the National Assembly on December 21, 1979, Li Yong Hui, the then director of the Council for National Unification, said: "To see whether the integration of regimes will succeed or not, it should be preceded by functional integration.... I intend to reexamine the proposal for functional integration and study it as a political task." (*Choson Ilbo* dated December 21, 1979.)

In March 1980 at the fourth meeting of working-level delegates for the north-south parliamentary meeting the delegate of the south side openly said: "The joint efforts of both north and south sides should be directed to the promotion of the process of reunification in which the conditions for reunification are improved through a series of gradual measures, as if the 'improved division' was their goal" (*Dong-A Ilbo* dated March 20, 1988).

With the debate on reunification on a civilian level coming to the fore in the '80s, the south Korean authorities could no longer treat the reunification issue in an abstract manner as before.

In the '80s, the capitalist world was faced with the universal economic crisis, and the international situation could be characterized as the advent of "another cold war". The Reagan government's policy for expansion of armaments which was symbolic of this brought about a radical change in the US world strategy.

The US world strategy in the '80s comprised

the war strategy based on the concept of the limited nuclear war and the strategy of simultaneous and all-round retaliation. The outcome of application of this strategy in Asia was: promotion of Japan to an axis in the system of regional security, conversion of south Korea which had been regarded as a "key region" into a "vital region where even a nuclear war is possible"; extension of south Korea-Japan relations which had been economic-oriented to the military sphere, promotion of the tripartite military tie-up between the US, Japan and south Korea; conversion of south Korea into the forward base against the Soviet Union. As a result, the danger of the Korean peninsula being converted into a field of a nuclear war loomed conspicuously as an actual problem as never before.

Such being the situation, the question of peace and security on the Korean peninsula was raised as a practical task, but it can be guaranteed only by the withdrawal of the US forces from the Korean peninsula and Korea's reunification, which was by no means acceptable to the United States. This made the United States strive for easing of tension on the Korean peninsula with maintenance of division and for political stability in the south.

Since the Chun Doo Hwan's regime was rigged up by bloody coup d'etat, it was in a very unstable state, its political legitimacy being likely to be questioned from the beginning. They tried to tide over the critical situation and plead the legitimacy of the government by bringing up their reunification formula. Meanwhile, on October 10, 1980,

north Korea indicated a concrete image of the unified state by advancing the proposal for founding the Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo.

This compelled the Chun Doo Hwan's government to come out with a new reunification proposal. It was the proposal for democratic reunification for national reconciliation made public on January 22, 1982. The *Choson Ilbo* dated January 23 the same year, said: "The significance of reunification policy advanced this time lies in that it is the crystallization of our basic views on national reunification.

"The proposal is inclusive. We did not deviate from the consistent policy of gradual approach—relaxation of tension, recovery of trust, north-south exchange, and achievement of reunification.

"Peaceful settlement (article 1) and recovery of trust (article 2) referred to in the three principles of reunification (this does not mean the three principles set forth in the July 4 North-South Joint Statement—author's notes) are included in article 7 of the tentative agreement and the general election based on the principle of representation proportional to the population, which is referred to in article 3, became a task to be carried out concretely through a referendum on draft constitution and the course of the general election based on the constitution.

"In addition, the proposal of nonaggression agreement and the reference to north Korea in June 23 foreign policy statement on peaceful reunification are all incorporated in the tentative agreement. Namely, the questions of armed non-

aggression and noninterference in internal affairs are included in articles 2 and 3 of the tentative agreement, the question of preservation of validity of the Armistice Agreement, in the 'maintenance of armistice' of article 4 of the tentative agreement, and the basic character of the question of simultaneous entry into the UN is referred to in 'respect for treaties and agreements concluded by both sides' in article 6 of the tentative agreement."

In other words, the "proposal of democratic, peaceful reunification through national reconciliation" is the "summary of the reunification proposals of the south Korean authorities after the '70s" (*From Paekdu to Hanna* by the School Presmen's Association in the Seoul region) and is the "systematization of reunification proposals unlike that under the Yushin regime (the Park regime)" (*From Division to Reunification* by the national section of Hangyorye Social Institute).

However, its substance, after all, can be said to be "orientated toward division".

Let us consider it in detail.

The "proposal of democratic, peaceful reunification" explained the process of reunification as follows: 1) Formation of the Council for National Reunification by north and south representatives 2) Drafting of the "reunification constitution" at the council 3) Affirmation of the "reunification constitution" by the south-north referendum and its proclamation 4) Enforcement of south-north general election, formation of unified national assembly and unified government. The proposal pro-

vided for conclusion of the 7-point "tentative agreement on the south-north basic relations" as a practical measure prior to reunification.

The contents of the tentative agreement are as follows:

1. To maintain mutual relations on the principles of mutual benefits and equality until the establishment of the unified state;

2. To settle peacefully the controversies through dialogue and mutual negotiations;

3. To admit mutually the different political regimes and social systems and not to interfere into the internal affairs of the other side;

4. To maintain armistice and consult about removal of military confrontation;

5. To promote social opening through exchange and cooperation to create the atmosphere of trust and reconciliation;

6. To respect all the international treaties and agreements concluded by both sides;

7. To appoint minister-level plenipotentiary and establish permanent mission in Seoul and Pyongyang.

In February that year the "20-point tentative measures" were announced with a view to implement the substance of the above-mentioned articles.

But the "‘proposal for democratic reunification through national reconciliation’ is nothing more than the copy of the basic treaty of East and West Germany concluded on November 8, 1972" (*Ibid.*), and is evidently designed to create "two Koreas".

This is also evident from the fact that the tentative agreement was said to be the "practical measure until reunification" (Chun Doo Hwan), that is, a measure for an intermediate stage. In fact, Chun Doo Hwan's Democratic Justice Party lays stress on the "debate on reunification in the 2000s", but this shows that the intermediate stage presupposes the maintenance of the status quo over a fairly long period.

An instance of this is the outspoken remark of Li Dong Bok, a delegate of the south Korean side to the south-north talks who said in his lecture in Washington, "There is no prospect of south-north reunification being achieved. Our contact with north Korea is not for reunification but is aimed at easing the tension between the south and the north and foreseeing the reckless attempt of north Korea" (*Sinhan Minbo* dated August 15, 1980).

Article 4 of the tentative agreement says:

"To maintain armistice and consult about removal of military confrontation", but armistice means a temporary suspension of hostilities and it is a sheer nonsense to remove military confrontation while maintaining armistice.

Removal of military confrontation means transition from armistice to a lasting peace and it can be guaranteed only when both Korea and the United States, signatories to the armistice agreement, agree on converting it into a peace treaty. Article 4 of the tentative agreement, after all, cannot but be interpreted as leading to maintenance of armistice agreement, continued presence of the

US army, and maintenance and perpetuation of military confrontation. Hence, the political terms “mutual benefit and equality” and “peaceful settlement of controversies” which are used between independent states are merely for propaganda.

Article 6 of the tentative agreement presupposes preservation of the instrument of the United States’ domination of south Korea and the international backgrounds for perpetual division such as South Korea-US Mutual Defence Treaty, establishment of South Korea-US Combined Forces’ Command and Japan-South Korea Treaty and does not offer prospect of reunification.

I will not touch on the point that for articles 3 and 5 to be feasible “National Security Law” and other laws hostile to north Korea and the social system at least should be rectified.

In conclusion, as for the “permanent mission” which was newly included in the proposal of “democratic reunification through national reconciliation” it is merely preparation for “two Koreas”.

Newspaper *Hanguk Ilbo* reported that an official of the US government said that the establishment of the liaison mission had been talked about since a few years by US scholars and the officials of the Administration as a step forward toward cross-recognition by south and north Korea and the four countries concerned (*Hanguk Ilbo* dated January 23, 1982). Cross-recognition was officially proposed by Kissinger, the US Secretary of State at the 30th UN General Assembly session on September 22, 1975. The proposal presupposed that the neighbour countries concerned recognized

both south and north Korea as independent countries. It goes without saying that it relates to the simultaneous entry into the UN by south and north Korea. The establishment of the permanent mission eventually leads to cross-recognition.

Chun Doo Hwan regime's "proposal for democratic reunification through national reconciliation" is aimed at making him the "prime agent" of the solution of reunification question, by eventually stressing the need to hold the south-north summit talks. It can be said to be inevitable that sending of relief goods carried on by the energetic fraternal efforts of north Korea following flood damage, meeting of separated families in south and north and exchanging of art troupes failed to make a breakthrough in south-north exchange due to the lack of concrete measures.

The Bequeathed Anti-Reunification Formula

The dictatorial regime which was brought to the brink of collapse by the mass struggle in June 1987 put forward a new policy in the Roh Tae Woo's June 29 statement following the United States' plan of change of political power structure. It was aimed at establishing stable ruling machinery by isolating the democratic forces of the nation from the masses by commitment of "realizing democracy" and by securing unity of the conservative forces which claimed for so-called "joint ownership of political power".

Roh Tae Woo's taking office as President showed that the policy began to achieve a measure of success, but the fact that the government was unstable and Roh Tae Woo himself was nicknamed incompetent President implied the political incompetence of the government.

Following the "June 29 declaration" the authorities carried out formal "democratic measures" when the mass forces of the nation, fully grasping their limitations, took advantage of them and pressed for implementation of democracy in practice. In addition, the political crisis of Roh's government was further aggravated with the upswing of the popular movement for reunification which had been openly launched since the beginning of 1988.

"Minority for the ruling party and majority for the opposition parties" in the results of the general election held in April that year made Roh's government seek a new form of managing the political situation. It took concrete form of the "policy of alliance of conservative forces", but it was a stopgap measure for those who were put on the defensive and could not hold back the upswing of the reunification movement occasioned by the campaigns for south-north student talks and south-north joint sponsorship of the Olympic Games.

According to the opinion surveys conducted for workers in Seoul from July 15 to August 2, 1988, 87 per cent of the asked persons called for "national reunification policy" and 80 per cent of them supported south-north student talks.

73 per cent of them were for the withdrawal of nuclear weapons and 83 per cent hoped for the reduction of armed forces of the south and north.

Particularly in 1988 the mounting mass movement for reunification was not disorganized and sporadic as before, but, as the term implies, qualitatively developed to the stage of reunification movement based on the coherent scientific analysis of the history of division of Korea and reunification movement. In a word, the aspect of the reunification movement as the social reform movement was reexamined and understood as being bound up inseparably with the democratization movement and the reunification movement began to be launched as such.

It goes without saying that such shift of the reunification movement shook the anticommunist splittist security system of Roh's government to the foundation. It was not surprising that Roh's government hastily had put forward a new reunification policy in an attempt to turn away the brunt of the reunification movement which might develop into the movement to overthrow the government. It was in this situation that Roh's July 7 declaration was issued.

July 7, 1988 declaration was intended to create the illusion about realization of south-north exchange, naming north Korea "national community". It was natural that this created the impression that Roh's government was seeking reconciliation, giving up the hostile attitude it had maintained so far.

But newspaper *Dong-A Ilbo* wrote: "The statement can be said to have been based on home political backgrounds.... It was necessary for the government to draw up a new reunification formula in the government level which generalized arguments on reunification" (*Dong-A Ilbo* dated July 8, 1988). Roh's government had to draw up government-level reunification formula by the policy of the "unified channel dialogue" to counter the extension of civilian-level debate on reunification and mass struggle for reunification and bring the mass movement under its control. So it was natural that it gave the impression that it was improvised or a medley. In fact, Roh's declaration was a replica of his predecessors' reunification policies.

Li Chan Gu, an assemblyman from the Party for Peace and Democracy, pointed out, "The contents of articles 4, 5 and 6 of the July 7 proposal are in essence same with the Park Jung Hee's statement made on June 23, 1973 and articles 1 and 3 of the proposal respectively correspond to articles 7 and 14 of the 20-point tentative measure Son Jae Sik, director of the Council for National Unification made public in 1982. ... Hence, the July 7 declaration has nothing new and President Roh merely acted as spokesman for Park Jung Hee, Li Hu Rak and Son Jae Sik" (*Choson Ilbo* dated July 8, 1988).

This was also proved by Roh Tae Woo's remark. In his press interview in early 1988, Roh Tae Woo spoke about the "conclusion of the tentative agreement on south-north basic relations and promot-

ing the creation of a precedent for south-north ministerial conference” and as for the question of reunification he made clear that he would follow the basic line of the “proposal of democratic reunification through national reconciliation” of Chun Doo Hwan’s government. In addition, in his interview with foreign journalists in June prior to the issue of his statement he said that he would in the future base south-north relations on the “tentative agreement on south-north basic relations” contained in the proposal for “democratic unification through national reconciliation”. Two days before the issue of the statement at the plenary session of the National Assembly the prime minister, too, said, “The government will make the current proposal for democratic unification through national reconciliation its basic policy.”

In other words, there is nothing new. It is ridiculous that Roh’s government, nevertheless, advertized it as “shift in understanding and idea” or as an “epochal policy of unification”. Tong Hun, ex-director of the Council for National Reunification, remarked, “A medley of declarations, proposals, suggestions and statements made in different situations is spoken of as reunification policy but it cannot be said to be the reunification policy in the true sense of the word” (*Dong-A Ilbo* dated July 1, 1987). This remark sounds like the prediction of the July 7 declaration.

That the July 7 declaration followed those of the predecessors manifests itself in that it reiterated the formula of “phased reunification” through

three phases—nonpolitical (economic, social and cultural) community, political community and reunification—as the “way to phased reunification”.

It was pointed out as the serious defect of the declaration that it made no mention of removal of military confrontation.

Commonwealth of States and “Division as Ever”

The July 7 declaration based on the “unified channel of dialogue” policy was branded by people as not deserving consideration. On the contrary, the July 7 declaration resulted in extending mass movement for the independent civilian-level exchange between south and north.

In addition, reunification movement in south Korea speedily extended the movement to know the north correctly. This greatly contributed to the participation of the mass in reunification movement. Particularly, the reunification problem which so far had remained an abstract idea and an ideal was posed before the people as a real feasible task and people came to understand that north Korean people were the same nation with whom reconciliation was possible and the same prime agent of reunification. This was a valuable success.

In a word, the anti-communist posture which had been held persistently as the major premise

by the dictatorial regime since division began to give way.

Symbolic instance of this was Rev. Moon Ik Hwan's Pyongyang visit which was the dramatic manifestation of the "people's aspiration for reunification which reached the boiling point" (Moon Ik Hwan). Particularly, it was probably a telling blow to Roh's government that Rev. Moon taking with him the 7-point reunification proposal advanced at the national symposium for peace on the Korean peninsula and independent reunification of the country held on April 16, exchanged views with the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland in north Korea, reached agreement on the reunification by means of confederation based on the July 4 joint statement and issued a joint statement.

Moreover, it goes without saying that the participation of Miss Rim Su Gyong, the delegate of "Chundaehyop" (National Council of Student Representatives), in the 13th World Festival of Youth and Students held in Pyongyang deepened the impression that the crisis of Roh's government had been aggravated. As people had expected, Roh's government harshly suppressed reunification movement. The "rule for public security" was established over south Korea as a whole and a general offensive was launched against the national democratic forces, invoking the "National Security Law".

The wholesale suppression of reunification forces made the people brand the July 7 declaration as a scrap of paper. Roh's government was

compelled to replace the July 7 declaration with a new reunification proposal including practical measures in an attempt to prevent the independent reunification movement on the civilian level from spreading even among the middle-of-the-road strata, while south Korea was brought under the "rule for public security".

Roh's speech delivered at the celebration of the day of liberation on August 15 was aimed at this. His speech "had the character of the basic framework of the reunification policy" of his government (*Choson Ilbo* dated August 16). It only outlined the principles of reunification and reunification proposal. This necessitated replica of the July 7 declaration based on his speech. This is the "reunification proposal for one national community". Let us consider the "reunification proposal for one national community" made public on September 11, leaving the consideration of the August 15 speech for another occasion.

The "reunification proposal for one national community" is as follows: 1) The unified democratic republic is achieved passing through the interim stage of the south-north commonwealth under the principles of independence, peace and democracy; 2) The unified state is a democratic state where liberty, human rights and welfare are guaranteed; 3) The unified state must be a single state and the coexistence of two states with different ideologies and systems is not complete reunification; 4) For the promotion of homogenization of the national community and the merger, social, cultural and economic community should

be realized first; 5) The stage of the south-north commonwealth must be as the transitional unified state of an interim stage toward complete reunification; 6) The south-north commonwealth is to have a Council of Presidents as its highest decision-making organ and a south-north Council of Ministers with representatives from both governments and a south-north Council of Representatives composed of National Assembly members is to be set up. Both sides send a permanent representative to Pyongyang and Seoul respectively; 7) South-north summit talks are to be held to discuss above-mentioned matters; 8) North Korea gives up the policy of reunification by communization and guarantees liberty and human right (like that in south Korea).

As is shown above, Roh's government regarded reunification problem as the problem of completing integration of different systems (a single state), that is, as the problem of absorbing and merging the other by the one in direct opposition to the reunification by means of confederation to nullify the three principles of independence, peace and great national unity laid down in the July 4 North-South Joint Statement. This is to be achieved through election. In conclusion, the government to be formed through election must be a "democratic republic" (that means that north Korea gives up socialism and adopts south Korean system).

This necessitated the principle of "democracy", but not that of great national unity.

It did not refer to the removal of political and

military confrontation, the prerequisite to the solution of reunification problem. It merely touched on the conversion of the armistice agreement into a peace treaty but said not a word about the United States, the party concerned. It gave no concrete answer to north Korea's persistent proposal of armament reduction and maintenance of peace. It is a self-evident truth that the proposal which does not cover the problem of military confrontation cannot be now accepted as a reunification proposal.

Mention should be made that the proposal envisages the commonwealth of states as an interim stage towards complete reunification. Needless to say that it is a copy of Park Jung Hee's step-by-step theory. Even in the light of the international law, the commonwealth of states implies existence of sovereign states in south and north Korea respectively. It should be stressed that this means existence of two states.

According to the above-mentioned reunification proposal, the commonwealth of two states is the form of existence of south and north Korea at the interim stage and goes over to complete reunification (a single state) through functional fusion. Originally, a single state through merger is unrealistic. Even if possible, the proposal does not mention the institutional measures to guarantee it. The proposal referred to the "south-north summit talks," "south-north Council of Ministers," and "south-north Council of Representatives", but it is very doubtful whether these bodies will really function as the body of council for reunification,

considering that the commonwealth of states is based on noninterference in internal affairs and that both south and north Korea will not give up each own system. On the contrary, there is far greater possibility that south and north Korea stress their independent sovereignty respectively and aggravated confrontation.

In addition, mention of "giving up the policy of reunification by communization" and "guaranteeing of liberty and human rights" is preposterous. Strictly speaking, it is wrong to say that north Korea insisted on "reunification by communization".

Now as in the past north Korea does not hold such point. North Korea has drawn a sharp line between the reunification problem and that of abolishing dictatorship in south Korea. Notwithstanding this, reference to the "reunification through communization" is a distortion and is designed to make the point ambiguous. It is right to consider that the "formula for reunification through communization" does not exist at least after north Korea proposed reunification by means of confederation.

It is evident that Roh Tae Woo's "formula of reunification for one national community" cannot be accepted as reunification proposal. Now the south Korean people regard north Korea's proposal of reunification by means of confederation as the most reasonable one and are striving to draw up their own proposal of reunification based on the reunification by means of confederation. It is no exaggeration to say that the "proposal of re-

unification for one national community" is not for reunification and is rather to counter and suppress reunification movement.

Hence, it can be characterized as the proposal to counter north Korea's proposal for founding the Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo.

It was not aimed for reunification and derived from confrontation stance toward north Korea.

As shown above, all the reunification proposals of south Korean authorities following Park Jung Hee's government were aimed for legalizing the status of division (transition from the abnormal status of division to normal status of division). Thus, various "theories" including those of step-by-step reunification, reunification by functional fusion and reunification by absorption were advanced to justify division.

In other words, the reunification proposals based on these "theories", however they may be embellished, are nothing more than the proposal for division.

FOCUS OF SOUTH KOREA

1. The Repercussions of Rev. Moon Ik Hwan's Trip to North Korea

North Korea visit of Rev. Moon Ik Hwan, adviser to the National Alliance for a Democratic Movement who is the symbol of south Korea's dissident groups, caused great repercussion at home and abroad.

He suddenly visited north Korea on March 25, 1989, talked with President Kim Il Sung, government officials of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Christians in north Korea and reached an agreement on actively expediting the solution of reunification problem.

South Korea intends to persecute Mr. Moon, invoking the "National Security Law" against him on charge of the lack of prior approval.

But public opinion raised its voice for the abolition of the "National Security Law", saying that it does not correspond to the present status of south-north relations and the present situation is that Roh's government itself ignores the law itself taking actions transcending the law in the course of promotion of south-north exchange.

The law designates north Korea as the area under the domination of the anti-state organization and stipulates that those who visit north

Korea are liable to severe punishment. The argument that north Korea visit of Chung Ju Yong, president of Hyundai group, a south Korean Concern, in January that year was authorized by the "ruling act of the President over the prior approval" but Moon's visit is not, is hardly convincing even in view of the principle of equity of law.

South Korean authorities persecuted Mr. Moon probably because it judged that otherwise it hardly could check the broad south-north independent exchange on a civilian level including those of opposition circles, students, religious men, men of art and literature and peasants. But Mr. Moon's visit of north Korea greatly contributed to the development of reunification dialogue on a civilian level since it broke down the big barrier of the "government's unified channel of dialogue" scheme. Opposition bodies, students and religious people already have issued statements in support of Mr. Moon's visit to north Korea and are directly resisting suppression by Roh's government.

In its statement issued on March 27, 1989 the National Alliance for a Democratic Movement (Chunminryun), an opposition organization, said that Rev. Moon's visit to north Korea "occasioned further development of the national mass movement for reunification". It requested the government "not to turn away from the people's aspiration for reunification and to stop crackdown on the reunification movement". That day Chunminryun set the movement for national reunification as the new main task of struggle in the first half of the year and directly opposed the suppressive

stance of the government. That day in its statement the Progressive Political Alliance "welcomed Mr. Moon's visit to north Korea in the hope that it would serve as an occasion for pooling the will of the nation about reunification and promoting national reunification" and stressed: "It should be regarded as a decisive step showing that the people are the master in the solution of the reunification question."

In its statement the National Council of Student Representatives (Chundaehyop) pointed out that Mr. Moon's visit to north Korea was a smart blow driving a wedge into the government's scheme to monopolize the debate on reunification and requested that the government, "with this as an occasion, desist from the scandalous stance against participation of Chunminryun in the pan-national rally and of Chundaehyop in the 13th World Festival of Youth and Students."

In its statement the south Korean Christian Social Alliance which was formed recently, too, called for the abolition of the "National Security Law", saying that it is unjustifiable to arrest and investigate by the anachronistic "National Security Law" which goes against the changing international situation and the people's aspiration for reunification.

Roh's government stepped up suppression of the forces desirous of independence, democracy and reunification following Mr. Moon's visit to north Korea, branding them as "pro-communist 'Left' ones", but it only resulted in revealing its anti-reunification splittist stance.

2. South Korea's Political Situation Taking on the Heightening Color of Confrontation

Roh Tae Woo's special statement on prolonging the interim appraisal which was known to be carried out without fail created a great uproar internally and externally. But, despite his statement the dissidents and students are stepping up confrontation with the government and the ruling party, voicing their resolve to continue the movement for the retirement of Roh Tae Woo.

On March 20, 1989 the "Headquarters of Joint Struggle for Retirement of Roh Tae Woo" which is composed of 10 opposition and students organizations including "Chunminryun (National Alliance for a Democratic Movement)" and "Chundaehyop (National Council of Student Representatives)" issued a statement and made clear that the opposition forces and the students would continue the joint struggle for Roh's resignation irrespective of his talk of prolongment. In its statement the organization pointed out that Roh Tae Woo's announcement on put-off of interim appraisal which was already expected is a fraud and deception on the people and demanded that the present government which is unwilling to clear away the survivals of the "Fifth Republic" and disclose the truth of the Kwangju incident should resign on its own accord.

As is known, the opposition force and students

formed on March 14 the "Headquarters of Joint Struggle for Resignation of Roh Tae Woo". The organization of the permanent headquarters of joint struggle attracted public attention in connection with an urgent question of students' entry to the "Chunminryun". As the reasons why Roh Tae Woo should resign, the organization adduced the facts: a) his complicity in a purge of disloyal elements from the army on December 12, the massacre in Kwangju and the irregularities of the Fifth Republic; b) seizure of power by rigged election; c) suppression of the people's right to existence by violence; d) the northern policy imposing on the people.

This organization is planning mass rallies in different parts of south Korea. Especially it is planning to combine the struggle for Roh's resignation with the workers' spring struggle to be conducted on regional scale and the peasants' rallies to be held in counties.

On March 19 the organization held for the first time a full-scale mass rally at the Hanyang University of Seoul demanding Roh Tae Woo's resignation. It was attended by 5,000, including a large number of trade unionists involved in labour disputes at the time. "This showed that labour movement was combined with anti-government movement." (*Nihonkeizai Shimbun* dated March 20.) On February 13, 1989 fifteen thousand farmers under the influence of "Chunminryun" staged demonstration in Seoul under political slogans. Such activities will become frequent in the future.

Entering 1989 the students who have aspired

to the popularization of the students movement, attaching the primary importance to campus democratization, employed a policy of switching in-campus movement to out-of-campus movement, declaring a struggle for nonconfidence in the Roh regime. Their moves, too, attract attention.

On March 15 the student associations of 38 universities affiliated with the general federation of student associations in Seoul district including the Seoul, Yonsei and Koryo Universities held general meetings calling for the resignation of Roh Tae Woo all at once. They are following this policy even after Roh's announcement on postponement of interim assessment.

In the campus movement of 1989 the participation of new students was conspicuous as never before. So the authorities expressed apprehension as to their ideological awakening in their high school days. In the struggle outside school the students are attempting to step up solidarity movement in support of the workers, along with their independent action. The "special action party" has already been dispatched to the Seoul subway and local trade union organizations in which labour disputes continue.

Moreover, the students' moves attract attention in connection with aggravating labour disputes in the Seoul subway trade union and the Hyundai Heavy Industries, and the "Chunrohyup", a federation of democratic trade unions, which is to be formed in the first half of 1990. (At present the number of applicants for admission to it is 260,000).

At this the south Korean authorities assume an attitude of suppressing it by force, alleging that it is aimed to overthrow the liberal democratic system. In particular, on the 22nd, immediately after his deferment announcement, Roh Tae Woo held at the presidential residence a "meeting of ministers in charge of public security" with the attendance of the director of the Agency for National Security Planning and home and law ministers and chief of national police headquarters and following this he is suppressing not only the students and opposition organizations but also the struggle of workers and farmers for the right to existence. Particularly the 12,000 front-line police carry weapons and 3,300 police boxes are provided with M-16 automatic rifles. This is the renouncement of even the stance for democratization and invites censure at home and abroad.

The stance of the Roh regime to intensify oppression incurs greater opposition of the forces for independence, democracy and national reunification.

3. Intensifying Labour Disputes

In south Korea workers are making on a full scale preparations to form "Chunrohyup (the national council of trade unions)" by amalgamating democratic trade unions. This adds fuel to labour disputes.

On March 16, 1989 four thousand Seoul subway trade union members of construction launched

general strike demanding the materialization of the written agreement, resignation of the government-backed director, release of ex-TU chairman and discontinuance of oppression of the movement. When the demonstration was crushed by the authorities that day they staged sit-in in the buildings of the Party for Peace and Democracy and the Democratic Party. They declared "they would continue sit-down struggle until their demands were met." Prior to this, they staged "free ride" struggle on March 6, 1989.

It marked the beginning of the action of protest of the Seoul subway trade union that although in October 1988 the Seoul subway construction trade union and the company adopted by mutual agreement a "note" the provisions of which should have come into force in January 1989, the management refused to bring into practice to arouse the opposition of the workers. This written agreement provided for the introduction of 8-hour working day, the dutiful defrayal of basic wages and other demands for the right to existence. However, the management did not carry out the agreement from the beginning and unilaterally abandoned it declaring that "its implementation is reserved". Moreover, Roh Tae Woo raised a big stick threatening to take "drastic measures" against the workers' struggle. This invited greater opposition of the workers.

In connection with the struggle of the workers of the Seoul subway construction, workers, students and opposition organizations and many other democratic organizations are holding rallies condemning

the violent suppression of trade unions. And joint struggles to support them grow in scale. In addition, the future development is worth notice because the Seoul subway construction trade union is the hard core of the Suroryun (the federation of trade unions in Seoul district) which carries great weight in the formation of the "Chunrohyup".

Meanwhile, on March 21, the 100th day of their strike, the workers of the Hyundai Heavy Industries Co. and families of workers, students and opposition organizations jointly held a meeting in the city of Ulsan of South Kyongsang Province to oppose the interference of government and denounced the suppression of labour movement by the authorities. That day in the meeting they published an open letter which condemned the outrages of the authorities that relied on the police to put down the strike and maintained that this would only aggravate labour disputes.

After June last year the labour-management negotiations interrupted. Following this, it was disclosed that the group violence against the workers employed by the Hyundai Group was committed by the management, and the oppression of workers was intensified. Under such circumstances the students and opposition organizations joined in the struggle of the workers to make it develop into a large-scale struggle. But the authorities mobilized over 9,000-strong police to suppress them down on March 30 and this aroused the greater indignation of the workers.

Besides, the workers' movements demanding the

revision of labour laws are extended in the frontier technical enterprises. The struggle begins to pick up at American and other foreign enterprises.

Entering 1989 the number of cases of labour dispute averaged 3.3 a day and it has reached 251 as of February 18. As labour movement is invigorated like this, the activities of democratic trade unions to form "Chunrohyup" has made a brisk headway.

It attracts attention that the trade unions of 67 enterprises affiliated with the council of trade unions in Songnam District, Kyonggi Province, under the government-backed South Korean Federation of Trade Unions (Rochong) formally declared that they would withdraw from Rochong and join "Chunrohyup".

The Rochong-affiliated trade unions in Songnam District and 30 trade unions affiliated with the "council of trade unions in Songnam District", under the regional trade union organization active for the promotion of the formation of "Chunrohyup", held on March 15 a "meeting of workers for the amendment of evil labour laws and wage increase" with an attendance of 5,500 trade unionists, and reached an agreement on inaugurating the "preparatory committee for the founding of the federation of trade unions in Songnam District" by uniting the trade unions which were active separately in this area until then. It was unprecedented that labour unions under the control of the Rochong collectively withdrew like this to unite with "Chunrohyup", and this gave a great shock to the authorities.

At present "Chunrohyup" comprises 11 regional TU councils including Seoul, Pusan, Masan and Chonju and 8 councils of various trades including hospital, foreign enterprises and technological construction. It is expected that the number of the trade unions under its influence will swell to about 770 and that of their members some 260,000. Preparations for the formation of "Chunrohyup" make good progress. It is believed that in future the number of trade unions affiliated with Chunrohyup will rise markedly after the spring struggle and its inauguration to make Chunrohyup have no little organizational power. The labour movement of south Korea surges forward to new heights.

4. "Report on Human Rights in South Korea for 1987-88"

The "report on human right for 1987-88" which was recently published by the "South Korean Lawyers Association" reviewed how things stood with human rights in south Korea in the past two years. It pointed out that "terrorism of government-backed ultra-rightist force is rampant" and cited, as typical examples of this, rightist terrorism, army and police, and violence in prison and doubtful death. Moreover, it indicated that in this period there was almost no change in the matter of rights to existence and various human rights of people including workers, farmers and slumdwellers, and the oppression of the national

and democratic movements to end national division and reunify the country continued as ever.

The violence against minister Chong Jin Dong of the industrial missionary society of Chongju city, terrorism of the agents of army intelligence command against O Hong Gun, a section chief of *Choongang Kyongje Sinmun*, the raid on and outrages against "Urimadang", the breakage of the photo of Li Han Ryul of Yunsei University and the incendiarism at Chonju church where it was expected to hold a meeting to denounce the violence against Father Pak Chang Sin were not isolated, chance occurrences but were interlinked with each other and represented typical ultra-rightist terrorism, said the report. Further, the report wrote that most of these terrorist groups had something in common with each other in that they were backed by the government, they were hostile to the north, showing pro-government inclination and had no mind to make south Korea democratic and independent, and that they received financial aid from without and commit every kind of violence under the connivance of government.

In connection with the increase of the cases of violence by rightist terrorism the report made clear its opinion as follows:

Now the rightist blackguards replace the authorities which once incurred people's resistance by using inhuman violence directly, and commit violence in place of them. So, they can perpetrate outrages more unscrupulously. Besides, they can effectively advertise "neutrality" and "justness"

and at the same time can play their part as a tool of physical domination. In addition, the report believed that rightist terrorism would continue in the future because it would play part of causing complications between the democratic forces fanning their ideological dispute deliberately.

Next, referring to the problem of human right in the army and police the report pointed out that after 1980, in the army in particular, the number of deaths totalled 2,670, 2,250 cases of suicide and 290 cases of homicide included, and the death toll in the army was 25 times as many as the average number in the whole country and stressed that this was a serious problem. Moreover, the fact that, the report wrote, there were cases of death whose cause was unknown and those of the missing in south Korea clearly showed that no radical change took place there in the matter of human rights, and it cited an instance.

According to it, in February 1987 Pfc. Kim Yong Gon who was enlisted in the army at the management faculty of Seoul University, was found dead hung on a rope round his neck in the barrack of "Camp Indian" in Uijongbu to which he belonged. After postmortem examination the US 8th army announced it as a case of suicide. But the family of the deceased and the fact-finding committee suspect the security unit, paying attention to the fact that there was no trace to show the course he took from the time he left home to go to hospital until he was found, that he usually complained of the tortures of the security unit, that the doubledecker bed to which he was

said to have hanged himself was only 1.2 metres high and he was on bended knees and that there was no particular motive of suicide and he left no will. Besides, it is said that except this there are 34 cases of death whose cause is still unknown.

The report stated that the problem of human rights in prisons posed a matter of great concern, too.

The infringement upon human rights in prisons, the report said, was disclosed in 1987 through the documents compiled by the Ministry of Justice. The number of deaths in prison was 22 and it amounted to 13 from January to August 1988. Reportedly they died of heart attack, breathing difficulty, asphyxia, cerebral hemorrhage, etc. And they were mostly young people in their twenties or thirties. So this cast the shadow of suspicion that they were killed by torture.

Referring to the fact that such infringement upon human rights was not ceased, the report wrote, "Since violence of human rights is an outcome of conflicts between social forces the remedy of the state of things related with human rights can hardly be expected unless the fundamental question of social system is settled."

(Toitsu Hyoron, No. 5 of 1989.)

IN FACE OF THE BARRIERS OF NATIONAL DIVISION

Moon Ik Hwan

On the Movement for Reunification

The 45 years of national division is a disgrace to our Korean nation. The movement for reunification is aimed at wiping away this disgrace.

I regard the 45 years of division as a disgrace to the nation, and I think if the division last over 50 years it will be an unbearable disgrace.

As an old man who is on the wrong side of seventy, I told of reunification before the young people, saw young men leap from the roof and burn themselves to death crying for the settlement of the national question, and heard a youth who got burnt all over and was dying in a hospital cry out the settlement of reunification problem. I deemed it an unendurable disgrace that I fruitlessly put on seventy years of age.

Seeing them who sacrificed their one and only lives I, as one of the elder generations, was deeply ashamed.

Gradually I was aware that to wipe away the disgrace was a matter related with my personal conscience. Of course, this is simply my subjective point of view.

It is an objective reality that the overseas Koreans residing in different regions of the world feel ashamed when they hear and see how the south and the north, split into two parts, slander each other.

This is not only the case of overseas Koreans. Internally, foreigners despise us very much because we are divided. The Soviet Union and China feel certainly contempt and bitter scorn paying attention to the fact that the south is inimical to the compatriots while seeking to establish diplomatic relations and have economic intercourse with the former which was once accused of supplying weapons to the north for the invasion of south Korea and trying to hold intercourse with the latter, the hostile power which participated in the June 25 war. They should say that though it bites at the fellow-countrymen, it wants to have intercourse with them. The same is the case with Japan or the United States, I think.

This 45-year long disgrace, this was not only the shame to conscience. This disgraceful 45 years were too long years in the international society.

If this division lasts more than half a century it will be a shame I cannot bear at all. The movement for reunification is first aimed to wipe away this disgrace.

Secondly, the movement for reunification is designed to put an end to the national sufferings and tragedy.

There are now ten million separated families among our people. Reportedly, during the June 25 war three million were killed. It is not known

how many people were killed beside them. The April 3 incident on the Cheju Island, the April 19 uprising, the Pusan and Masan incidents and the Kwangju incident are all tragedies brought about by the national division. Excepting these incidents, what a great number of people were condemned as "Reds" at the court and shot to death or are now in prison owing to the split of the nation?

The elimination of these tragedies is just the aim of the reunification movement.

Thirdly, the reunification movement has the liberation of the masses in view.

How is the livelihood of the workers and peasants who hold the three fourths of the forty million population? They toil and moil to feed us but it is only debts which are multiplying in their lives. There are those who are too poor to marry, though over forty, and peasants who remain in the country not because they have no ability but because they think what will become of the countryside if even they leave it for the reason of their hard life. We should know their hardships. What a huge army of indigent citizens are there who have to do day labour or run small shop unable to find job at factories after coming to cities from rural districts?

The masses are the substantial component part of the nation. Then why should they lead such a life?

According to the statistics of 1987 alone, the yearly military expenditures amounted at least to ten billion dollars. This is not for the defence

of the country from foreign aggression.

For levelling guns at our compatriots, turning against them, instead of forming national community and living harmoniously with them, as much as ten billion dollars were squandered in a year.

Because of this the popular masses cannot emerge from poverty. Therefore, the reunification question can be said to be the question of liberating the masses.

Accordingly, the labour movement and the movement of peasants are directly connected not only with the question of their rights to existence but also with the question of reunification.

Fourthly, the reunification movement is aimed to overcome the logic of division and check moral degradation.

The logic of division which has swayed our thinking and life for the last 45 years is a question. It represents a formalistic view that the north can never intend good things while the south never intends bad things. So, if one says the north has merits this is regarded as inspiring and admiring the north and sympathizing with it and as an act to serve the interests of enemy; if one finds faults with the south and demands it to put them right and criticizes it he is regarded as committing a "Leftist" and pro-communist act and even is tried for his alleged act of benefiting the enemy. Such logic of good and bad should be eliminated. This logic brings about distrust, showdown and conflicts among our people in the fields of politics, the economy, social culture and morality and so, Chang Jun Ha said that the

division would bring down ruin on our nation.

Fifthly, the reunification movement plays a world-historic role.

We must know that because Korea is divided at this important time when a new order of Asia begins to establish she fails to play an important world-historic role.

Sixthly, the reunification movement is the movement to greatly augment our nation.

The reunification is not merely a question of uniting us, our nation, into one extending from Mt. Paekdu to Mt. Halla, but a question of augmenting our nation.

The division dwarfed our nation and our country. This implies not only that our national territory becomes small but also that the scope of our thinking gets restricted.

Therefore the reunification movement enlarges our nation and this is what I want to stress with regards to the reunification movement.

My Object of Visit to the North

First, in connection with the south-north problem, the democratic forces of the south have so far made efforts to pull down the wall of national division. Instead of simply speaking of that the north is our homeland along with the south, I wanted to tread on the land of the north with my feet to ascertain for myself the fact that there is my another homeland and to show this symbolically. This brought me to break down

the barrier.

Secondly, because I was informed indirectly until now of how President Kim Il Sung and other leaders of the north think of the reunification and I could not obtain materials about it, I wanted to meet them and directly exchange opinions with them openheartedly and know their real intention. In addition, I thought that the north learnt indirectly about the question of democratization and reunification in the south, to be sure, so as a person living in the south I wanted to mediate between the south and north by informing them of our situation, that is, the developments of the reunification movement in the south.

Thirdly, though I am not a politician, I, as a private civilian, wanted to make a breakthrough and open up the possibility of dialogue like politicians settle questions through political talks.

On account of my publication of the "April 2 joint statement" they say that I acted in concert with the north, but I do not think that my alignment with the north is wrong.

When the husband wants to grow maize in the plots while his wife potatoes, either of them must follow the other. Only then can the family be peaceful. What's wrong with planting potatoes? Isn't it that one side proposes three-way talks while the other side comes out with two-way talks, doing not bate a jot of their demands so the reunification has not been achieved for no less than 45 years?

In fact, when I went to the north, I proposed to it that in order to realize the political and

military talks proposed by it, it should comply with all kinds of talks and exchanges suggested by the south. As for the form of a confederal system, that of establishing a confederal system by founding the Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo which is proposed by the north takes into account the south's proposal for the confederation of systems. So all this tells that the north side made concessions. One should not distort this.

I think we should first give up the way of thinking that the confederal system and democracy are mutually destructive. A confederal system is a system of local autonomy, which is most basic system of democracy, so it is not contradictory to democracy.

It is said that in October 1980 the north changed the stand which it had maintained so far and rounded off a proposal for reunification by form of confederal system, but, so far as I know, the north side has consistently maintained the confederal system since the 1960s and the south side insisted on "cross recognition" and "simultaneous admission to the UN". Viewed in the light of standpoint of the north side, the insistence of the south side is devoted to scheming the German-style division.

If the south side wants to create two Koreas so badly, I think it is better to perpetuate it by introducing the confederal system proposed by the north.

Anti-American Sentiment

Referring to my anti-American sentiment, they say that I supported the maintenance of the north that south Korea is under the control of the United States. Resultantly, there may be some respect in which my private judgement agrees with that of the north. But this does not represent, on all accounts, my support of the north but is the outcome of my independent judgement.

There is no need for us to take bread because the north proposes to eat rice.

Importance should be attached to building a democratic society where the masses are united as one and become its masters and the nation that is never enslaved and dominated by outside forces. There is no rule that we should never take rice because those in the north eat it. This is, in the final analysis, the way of thinking of the fools who assert that the use of the term "tongmu" (comrade) should be forbidden in the south because it is used in the north.

We live, subjected to a considerable pressure of the outside forces. The economic pressure which is applied recently by the United States to the south Korean countryside and its economy in disregard of their ruins has been caused by the fact that we lack independence and are subjected to it.

No matter what they say in the north, we must throw off such a yoke and become an independent

nation. This is the demand of the present age and every Korean should strive for this.

In fact, the anti-US movement in south Korea started only recently.

In 1978 when I met a correspondent of the *New York Times* after being released from prison I told that "If your nation does not change its policy toward south Korea, it will come to oppose the United States." This got news coverage. But I heard that he was blamed in this way: "How can south Korea oppose the United States? Why have you written such an article?" This happened in 1978. But in 1981 the incendiary incident of the US Cultural Centre in Pusan occurred. It was a surprise. In addition, the incendiaries were ultra-conservative presbyterian theological school students. I did not expect that anti-Americanism would visit south Korea so early. Then, why have such things occurred? They were not at all caused by the north's agitation.

Here I should like to make a few words about the question of the US army. In particular, in the atmosphere of the relaxation of international tensions the Soviet Union proceeds to disarmaments. In no more than five years the truce line in Korea will lose its importance as the United States' strategic line against the USSR. If things come to this pass, the US army must withdraw from our country. Preceding this our nation should become literally an independent nation and the government become virtually the people's government whose master is the people and the government which defends the life of the people. Why

is it that the government schemes to maintain the security of the country by presence of the US army which should get out? Basically this is because the way of thinking of those in charge of national defence is utterly wrong. This is really shameful. This is an insult to the nation.

“National Security Law”

In March 1, 1976, in connection with the incident of the democratic, national salvation declaration, I was regarded as the prime mover and arrested and tried.

The declaration stressed the need to democratize the country, reform the economic structure of the “rich getting richer and the poor getting poorer” and pave the road to reunification. This was condemned as violation of emergency measures and I was sent to prison. Later, on December 31, 1977 I was released. In October 1978, I made public statement exposing the undemocratic nature of the “Yushin Constitution” on the 6th anniversary of its publication. In this way, I violated the emergency measures again, so suspension of penal execution for me was cancelled and I returned to prison. Like this, even doing penal servitude, we eventually smashed emergency measures.

In 1986 the “May 3 Inchon incident” occurred because we insisted on the amendment of the constitution while the government opposed it. At that time, too, I was arrested and condemned to penal servitude, but finally we won victory. The

government which insisted on the defence of the constitution yielded and retreated. But those who made right assertion had to be condemned to penal servitude and those who had to retreat for their wrong opinions are in as ever. But we were crowned with final victory. This is the way we have come along so far.

Then, how do matters stand with the "National Security Law"? It is a law which was enacted in 1948 when the Liberal Party was in power, defining the north as anti-state organization. This might have been justified under the Liberal Party's rule, but things are different today. Addressing the National Assembly, an assemblyman from the Democratic Justice Party, stated: "What is reunification? It means uniting two states and two systems into one. This is reunification." Like this, Roh Tae Woo's "July 7 declaration" was not denied. In other words, the Democratic Justice Party certainly sees the north as its companion as ever. If so, why is the "National Security Law" which was applied in the period when the north was defined as an anti-state organization not abrogated even today when they say they no longer regard the north as such? They do not repeal it in order to use it as an instrument to oppress the people. So, because this anti-communist law was obviously aimed at suppressing the reunification movement occasioned by the April 19 uprising, no one can believe the reunification advocated by the government unless it is repealed. It should be abrogated by all means.

CONCLUSION

I am a born optimist. I view everything with hope in an optimistic way and I believe everything will go right. But, I was in the depths of despair on the day when I returned to Seoul. Objectively speaking, I was also thrown into crushing despair because I thought that if I was arrested after achieving unimaginably great successes, everything would go up in smoke and the national reunification be deferred twenty or thirty years.

I expected penal servitude but tried by all means not to be driven into it. But the government stated that it would arrest me under any circumstances. I did not feel painful at all because I was accustomed to prison life, but thinking of the future of the nation, I felt I should not be placed in such a plight. But I do not lose heart.

This is because I consider the burning aspiration for national reunification which sweeps the north and the south as the force which no one can thwart.

Though I am now in prison, I only want to have a dialogue with the government. Until now I have continued dialogues with the government. On August 1, 1976, at the time of democratic, national salvation declaration incident, I extended protest to the Court: if it declares guilty for the

reason of having made a statement which demands to democratize the country, eliminate such contradictions as the "rich getting richer and the poor getting poorer" and open the door to national reunification for the sake of the honour of our country, what will become of the independence of the Ministry of Justice of this country and of its international prestige?

I earnestly asked the Ministry of Justice to maintain its prestige.

This goes for the government, too. The same may be said in connection with the "incident of conspiracy for rebellion" in 1980 and "May 3 Inchon incident" in 1986. Even now I have the same opinion. I want as before to hold dialogue with the government. This is my desire.

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